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I. INTRODUCTION
On January 12, 2005, the Supreme Court's much-anticipated opinion in United
States v. Booker overhauled the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (hereinafter
Guidelines].' In the first part of the opinion [hereinafter Booker A], the Court held
that a Sixth Amendment violation occurs when a judge increases a defendant's
sentence based upon factual findings made by the judge rather than a jury. The
Guidelines explicitly call for such judicial fact-finding. Accordingly, even before
Booker, many viewed the Guidelines as constitutionally vulnerable in light of the
Court's landmark opinion last term in Blakely v. Washington, which invalidated
critical provisions of a similar state sentencing scheme.' Booker A was a natural
outgrowth of Blakely.
In the second part of the Booker opinion, however, [hereinafter Booker B], the
Court saved the Guidelines by (1) severing the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984's
provision mandating that judges follow the Guidelines and (2) imposing a
"reasonableness review" on appeal.' In essence, the Court created an "advisory
guidelines" system.4 Thus, while Booker A focused on the importance of the jury,
Booker B did nothing to vindicate that interest.' Rather, this second part of the case
lauded the critical role of judicial fact-finding in the Guidelines regime. The
explanation for this jarring result is that four of the five justices subscribing to
Booker B dissented from Booker A, meaning that they were unconvinced that the
Guidelines violate the Sixth Amendment in the first place.6 Only Justice Ginsburg
subscribed to both key parts of the Court's opinion.
Despite the welcoming response of some commentators to Booker, Congress
is unlikel, to be sanguine about its apparent return of expansive discretion of the
judiciary. In the increasingly contentious tug of war between Congress and the
1. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). Throughout this Article, the capitalized term,
"Guidelines," references the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Booker also resolved the companion
case, United States v. Fanfan.
2. 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
3. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756-57, 765-67.
4. The district court judge who issued the first post-Blakely opinion essentially took this approach.
See United States v. Croxford, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1230 (D. Utah 2004). Sentencing commentator
Stephanos Bibas also identified voluntary guidelines as a possible approach following Blakely. See
Stephanos Bibas, Blakely 's Federal Aftermath, 16 FED. SENT. REP. 333, 335 (2004) (suggesting that
the Guidelines "may still serve as voluntary, non-binding guidance").
5. See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 795 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part) (noting that "[tihe majority's
solution fails to tailor the remedy to the wrong").
6. Justice Stevens wrote Booker A, joined by Justices Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg.
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Ginsburg joined Justice Breyer, who
wrote Booker B, to form a majority with respect to that portion of the case.
7. Cf. Rachel E. Barkow, The Devil You Know: Federal Sentencing After Blakely, 16 FED. SENT.
REP. 312, 312 (2004) (noting that "the politics of federal criminal justice" is a factor that "counsel[s]
against premature celebration of the end of the rigidity of the Sentencing Guidelines").
[Vol. 56: 533
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courts over judicial sentencing discretion,8 any temporary victory that the courts
claim after Booker is pyrrhic. The 2003 passage of Title IV of the PROTECT Act,
commonly known as the Feeney Amendment, clearly indicated that Congress has
no patience for wide-ranging judicial discretion. Indeed, the Feeney Amendment,
which represented "the most sweeping legislation since the creation of the
Sentencing Guidelines," dramatically restricted downward departures from the
Guidelines.1° Congress enacted these controversial reforms to rein in judges who,
in ConFess's view, were granting unjustified leniency under the Guidelines
regime.' Thus, inherent tension exists between the Feeney Amendment dictates
and the Booker B holding: the former calls for stiffer sentences and even less
discretion for judges, while the latter removes the mandatory nature of the
Guidelines altogether. By rendering the Guidelines "advisory," the Court, among
other things, effectively nullified that portion of the Feeney Amendment which
sought to restrict judicial downward departure discretion.
While the reverberations of Blakely2 muted-and Booker arguably
mooted-the protests over the Feeney Amendment, 3 Congress's effort to further
curtail sentencing discretion remains enormously relevant even in the aftermath of
Blakely and Booker. Congress's deeply suspicious attitude toward sentencing
judges provides a guidepost to how Congress will react to the breach in the
Guidelines structure that Booker created, and Congress's posture does not indicate
a ready acceptance of the return of sentencing discretion to the judicial branch. To
the contrary, Booker may provide an impetus for an even more radical curtailment
8. As two sentencing commentators have recently noted,
politics drives sentencing today now more than ever .... The tension between
the three coordinate branches over sentencing remains a battle still very much in
progress; [the] Feeney debate [referring to last year's Feeney Amendment, which
curtailed judges' capacity to depart downward from Guidelines sentences]
continues to resonate in all three branches, although it has created unusual
tensions between Congress and the courts.
Benson B. Weintraub & Benedict Kuehne, The Feeney Frenzy: A Case Study in Actions and Reactions
in the Politics of Sentencing, 16 FED. SENT. REP. 114, 117 (2003); see also Douglas A. Berman, Taking
Stock of the Feeney Amendment's Many Facets, 16 FED. SENT. REP. 93, 96 (2003) ("[T]he level of ill-
will between the federal judiciary and Congress seems to have reached a peak as a result of the
enactment of the Feeney Amendment."); see generally Jeffrey Standen, The End of the Era of
Sentencing Guidelines: Apprendi v. New Jersey, 87 IOWA L. REV. 775, 776 (2002) (describing the
"continuing struggle between legislatures and courts for control over criminal procedure").
9. See infra Part V(B).
10. Alan Vinegrad, The New Federal Sentencing Guidelines: The Sentencing Commission 's
Response to the Feeney Amendment, 16 FED. SENT. REP. 98, 98 (2003). Specifically, "Congress
directed the Sentencing Commission to promulgate, within 180 days, guidelines amendments 'to ensure
that the incidence of downward departures are substantially reduced."' Id. (quoting Prosecutorial
Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today (PROTECT) Act of 2003
[hereinafter PROTECT Act], Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(m)(2)(A), 117 Stat. 650, 675 (2003)).
Vinegard's article outlines the Commission's response, including its elimination of six grounds for
departure. See Vinegrad, supra, at 99-100.
11. See Margareth Etienne, Acceptance of Responsibility and Plea Bargaining Under the Feeney
Amendment, 16 FED. SENT. REP. 109, 109 (2003) ("Much of the controversy regarding Title IV of the
newly enacted PROTECT Act, known generally as the Feeney Amendment, has focused on the
amendment's restrictions of judicial departure authority.") (citing PROTECT Act, § 401(g), 117 Stat.
at 671).
12. See Douglas A. Berman, Examining the Blakely Earthquake and Its Aftershocks, 16 FED.
SENT REP. 307, 307 (2004) (referring to Blakely as an "earthquake").
13. See Vinegrad, supra note 10, at 98 (noting the "barrage of judicial criticism" levied at the
Feeney Amendment).
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of sentencing discretion and an increase in the mandatory minimum sentences that
are the bane of the academy, defense bar, and judiciary alike.'4
Any realistic assessment of Booker's longevity must acknowledge the premise
that Congress is skeptical of-indeed, hostile to-the notion that judicial discretion
will lead to appropriate and uniform sentences. This Article proposes revisions to
the Guidelines that work within the context of the current congressional
climate-as Booker B assuredly does not."
Part II of this Article starts with a brief history of the Guidelines, promulgated
as a result of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,6 legislation that arose because
of deep congressional frustration with the then-current discretionary sentencing
scheme. 7 Part III lays the groundwork for Blakely and Booker by outlining
Blakely's forerunner, Apprendi v. New Jersey.'8 Apprendi itself highlighted the
potential constitutional problem with judicial fact-finding that increases a
defendant's sentence and Apprendi spawned a raft of legal scholarship. Because
of the existing, exhaustive scholarly work on Apprendi, Part III.A treats Apprendi
and prior case law in a relatively truncated fashion. Part III.B discusses the lower
courts' interpretation of Apprendi, which limited its potential impact on the
Guidelines. While Apprendi held that a jury must decide any fact (besides
recidivism) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime, a number of factual
findings can affect the applicable Guidelines range without impacting the maximum
statutory sentence. Prior to Blakeley, lower federal courts consistently interpreted
Apprendi to mean only that factual findings that moved a defendant from one
statutory penalty level to another violated the Sixth Amendment.
Narcotics cases are illustrative. In Table I below, the grey-shaded area
represents the statutory sentencing boundaries corresponding to the crime of
distribution of five kilograms, one kilogram, and 100 grams of cocaine,
respectively.' 9 Those areas reflect the broad statutory sentencing range to which
a defendant convicted of distributing the above amounts of cocaine is subject. For
example, the possible sentences for a defendant convicted of distributing five
kilograms of cocaine range from imprisonment for ten year to imprisonment for
life. The minimum sentence for a defendant convicted of distributing more than
14. See Gary Fields and Laurie P. Cohen, Mandatory Sentences Loom as Issue, WALL ST. J., Sept.
30, 2004, at A4.
15. Cf. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 790 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting in part) ("The
majority's remedial choice is thus wonderfully ironic: In order to rescue from nullification a statutory
scheme designed to eliminate discretionary sentencing, it discards the provisions that eliminate
discretionary sentencing.").
16. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3586 (2000); 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98
(2000).
17. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 established the United States Sentencing Commission,
which in turn promulgated the United States Sentencing Guidelines. The Guidelines took effect in
1987. For a thorough discussion of the Guidelines, see KATE STITH & Jost A. CABRANES, FEAR OF
JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (1998); see also Stephen Breyer, The
Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1 (1988) (discussing background of the Guidelines).
18. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
19. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)-(C) (2000). Subsection (b)(l)(D) provides for lower penalties,
but that subsection applies only to the distribution of marijuana and other lesser drugs. The prior three
subsections of § 841 are the exclusive provisions for the "hard drugs" of heroin, powder cocaine, and
crack cocaine.
[Vol. 56:533
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five kilograms of cocaine is ten years, as the black-shaded area represents. ° In the
five-kilogram example, the white zone illustrates the Guidelines' relatively narrow
sentencing range, which is within the statutorily-permitted grey zone. Those ranges
are 121-151 months, 63-78 months, and 27-33 months for distribution of five
kilograms, one kilogram and 100 grams of cocaine, respectively,2 ' before any
additional Guidelines adjustments for conduct such as use of a firearm or additional
drug quantities under the "relevant conduct" provision.2
Table 1
Guidelines Ranges Within Statutory Boundaries
Comne Distribution
To the extent that the Guidelines provide for much narrower ranges within the
statutory range, the lower courts found that a judge who did not engage in fact-
finding that ratcheted up the maximum statutory sentence a defendant faced did not
violate Apprendi. Judicial fact-finding that increased only the applicable maximum
Guidelines range therefore continued afterApprendi.23 Judicial fact-finding leading
to higher Guidelines ranges is the practice that Blakely appeared to have
20. See id. § 841(a) (prohibiting distribution of a controlled substance); see also id. § 841
(b)(1)(A) (providing penalty provision for distribution).
21. See United States Sentencing Guidelines § 2D1. 1(c)(4), (7), (11) (Nov. 2004) [hereinafter
U.S.S.G.]; see also U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A (Nov. 2004) (see infra note 45). The Guidelines Sentencing
Table provides Guidelines ranges in months (see Exhibit A); the graph represents the Guidelines
sentencing ranges when converted to years.
22. See infra Part I.B.
23. As represented in the graph, this process would involve moving a white zone within a grey
zone by, for example, finding that a defendant was responsible for additional drug quantities under the
"relevant conduct provision." See infra note 54 and accompanying text. This judicial fact-finding
would have the effect of increasing a defendant's Guidelines sentencing range without going outside
the limits of the statutory constraints the grey areas represent. For example, if the judge found the
defendant to be responsible for drug quantities in excess of one kilogram, the defendant's "white zone"
would move to the right, resulting in a higher sentence.
41(bXI, )A)
5 kilograms
S41(bX I)B}
I kigraimn
100 tpa ls,
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deconstitutionalized,24 and which Booker explicitly holds is unconstitutional under
a mandatory Guidelines regime. Part III.C of this Article provides an analysis of
Blakely, which produced a bitterly divided Court.
Part IV addresses the lower courts' struggles to address the Blakely decision,
before Booker, through two primary means: by setting aside the Guidelines
altogether or by working within an eviscerated Guidelines system. As further
illustrated in Part IV, several lower courts assumed the Guidelines are "severable,"
thus amenable to the excise of Guidelines provisions requiring judges to enhance
sentences. Judges taking this approach attempted to comply with Blakely by
refusing to adjust defendants' sentences upward, but by otherwise applying the
current Guidelines framework. This approach undoubtedly complies with the Sixth
Amendment but results in sentences radically lower than those the Guidelines
currently prescribe.
By contrast, some courts found the Guidelines unseverable and applied the
Guidelines as if they were wholly advisory. For example, in United States v.
Croxford,25 Judge Paul Cassell took an approach that resulted in a sentence very
close to that which the Guidelines required. Cassell held that the Guidelines must
rise or fall as a united whole, because giving defendants the benefits of downward
adjustments without the burdens of sentence enhancements results in a lopsided
system inconsistent with the goals of the Sentencing Reform Act. Judge Cassell
treated the Guidelines as only advisory and reclaimed virtually all of the broad pre-
Guidelines judicial sentencing discretion, subject only to statutory limits. The
Booker Court ultimately adopted a similar approach, but did so by severing that
provision of the Guidelines which makes the regime mandatory. Part IV.C outlines
the Court's recent Booker decision in summary form.
In light of Congress's recent passage of the Feeney Amendment, demonstrating
congressional intolerance for judicial downward departures from the Guidelines,
Congress almost certainly will not abide a return to wide-ranging judicial
discretion. Few judges are as deferential to the goals of uniformity underlying the
Guidelines as Judge Cassell. As Justice Scalia noted in his dissent in Booker B,
judges "certainly cannot" be "expected to adhere to the Guidelines" given their
"notorious unpopularity."'26 Indeed, just two days after the Supreme Court handed
down the Booker decision, a federal district judge in Wisconsin declined to follow
the Guidelines, finding that "Booker is not ... an invitation to do business as
usual."27 In a decision emphasizing the defendant's individual circumstances, the
judge imposed a sentence below the Guidelines that was "sufficient, but not greater
than necessary, to satisfy the purposes of sentencing."2
Congress will now have to confront the enervated Guidelines wrought by
Booker B. As Justice Breyer explicitly noted: "Ours, of course, is not the last
word: The ball now lies in Congress' court. The National Legislature is equipped
to devise and install, long-term, the sentencing system, compatible with the
24. "Deconstitutionalized" is used here as a synonym for "rendered unconstitutional." Others
have used the term to refer to something having been interpreted as no longer constitutionally required.
See Yale Kamisar, Foreword: From Miranda to §3501 to Dickerson to... 99 MICH. L. REv. 879, 888
(2001) (referring to the Supreme Court's efforts to dilute, or "deconstitutionalize," Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966)).
25. 324 F. Supp. 2d 1230 (D. Utah 2004), adhered to by 324 F. Supp. 2d 1255 (D. Utah 2004).
26. United States v. Booker, 125 S. C. 738, 790-91 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
27. United States v. Ranum, 353 F. Supp. 2d 984, 987 (E.D. Wis. 2005).
28. Id.
[Vol. 56: 533
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Constitution, that Congress judges best for the federal system of justice."29
Accordingly, Part V addresses the question of how to amend the Guidelines to
reclaim their mandatory status while also complying with the Sixth Amendment
requirements of Blakely and Booker.
Taking a chapter-by-chapter approach, I propose several significant reforms to
the Guidelines, including amending the relevant conduct provision and providing
for an increase in the jury's role at sentencing. These reforms would provide a
starting point for resolving the constitutional infirmities of the post-Blakely and
Booker A Guidelines while also avoiding the infirmities of the fix that Booker B
provided. Finally, I propose an altered sentencing table, providing for higher
maximum sentences at most levels, to counteract the unwarranted sentence-
reducing effects that might otherwise result. My proposals are designed to both (1)
anchor a defendant's sentence more closely to jury findings 0 and thus broadly
vindicate Sixth Amendment rights that are at the heart of Blakely and Booker A and
(2) continue greater uniformity in sentencing, a goal the Guidelines were designed
to accomplish.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE GUIDELINES
A. The Pre-Guidelines World
In the era prior to the Sentencing Guidelines, federal district court judges
enjoyed virtually unlimited discretion in sentencing defendants.3 For example, a
defendant convicted of murder in aid of racketeering could receive a sentence
ranging from life imprisonment to mere probation. 2 In 1973, then-Judge Marvin
E. Frankel published a compelling and highly influential sentencing study3
describing the discretionary power of judges as "almost wholly unchecked and
sweeping" and condemning that sentencing regime as "terrifying and intolerable for
29. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 768.
30. Of course, a guilty plea is the resolution of most federal criminal cases, and in such cases, my
proposals would tie sentences more closely to a defendant's admissions during the plea.
31. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989) ("For almost a century, the Federal
Government employed in criminal cases a system of indeterminate sentencing. Statutes specified the
penalties for crimes but nearly always gave the sentencing judge wide discretion to decide whether the
offender should be incarcerated and for how long[.]"). Similarly, Stith and Cabranes point out that:
From the beginning of the Republic, federal judges were entrusted with wide
sentencing discretion. The great majority of federal criminal statutes have stated
only a maximum term of years and a maximum monetary fine, permitting the
sentencing judge to impose any term of imprisonment and any fine up to the
statutory maximum.
STITH & CABRANES, supra note 17, at 9 (footnote omitted).
32. See 18 U.S.C. § 1959 (1993) (providing for sentence of "any term of years"). Congress
amended the statute in 1994 and now provides that, for murder, the sentence for a convicted defendant
is "death or life imprisonment, or a fine under this title, or both .... " 18 U.S.C. § 1959 (2000); cf
Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2545 (2004) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that, in
Washington state, "[b]efore passage of the [Reform] Act, a defendant charged with seccnd degree
kidnaping, like petitioner, had no idea whether he would receive a I 0-year sentence or probation").
33. MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1973).
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a society that professes devotion to the rule of law. '34 Uncertainty and unwarranted
disparities plagued the sentencing system.s5
B. The Sentencing Guidelines
In 1984, the Sentencing Reform Act put an end to unfettered discretion.36
Sentencing reform enjoyed wide, bipartisan support. The strange alliance of
Senators Kennedy, 3' Hatch, Biden, and Thurmond sponsored the bill.3' Liberals
and conservatives may have pushed for reform for different reasons: liberals feared
that such discretion led to unwarranted disparities based on race or economic
backgrounds; conservatives feared that unfettered discretion was a license for
leniency.39  Both groups, however, lacked faith in individual judges.' The
Sentencing Reform Act created the United States Sentencing Commission, which
was empowered to promulgate "guidelines" establishing sentencing ranges for all
federal offenses.4
The determination of sentences under the Guidelines is by reference to a
sentencing "grid," which contains an "Offense Level" along the vertical axis and
a "Criminal History Category" along the horizontal axis. 2 The horizontal axis
34. Id. at 5. For a thorough discussion of the background leading up to the passage of the
Guidelines, and the contributions of Frankel and others, see STITH & CABRANES,jupra note 17, at 9-37;
see also Frank 0. Bowman, II, Fear of Law: Thoughts on Fear of Judging and the State of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 44 ST. Louis U. L.J. 299, 300-05 (2000) (describing sentencing before the
Guidelines).
35. Cf Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2545 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that a sentence in
Washington state before sentencing reform "could turn as much on the idiosyncrasies of a particular
judge as on the specifics of the defendant's crime or background").
36. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 396 (stating Guidelines "fetter the discretion of sentencing judges").
For thorough treatment of the legislative history of the Sentencing Reform Act, see Kate Stith and Steve
Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223 (1993).
37. For a discussion focusing on Senator Kennedy's leadership role in the process, see Stith &
Koh, supra note 36, at 230-57 (discussing additionally the role of proposals developed during a 1995
Yale sentencing seminar).
38. See Ronald F. Wright, Rules for Sentencing Revolutions, 108 YALE L. J. 1355, 1361 (1999)
(reviewing STITH & CABRANES, supra note 17, and citing id. at 48).
39. "When liberals saw disparity, they pictured sentencing judges who discriminated on the basis
of race, class, and gender; when conservatives saw disparity, they pictured judges who imposed overly
lenient sentences." Id. at 1361 (citing STITH & CABRANES, supra note 17, at 38-39).
40. See id. at 1361-62 (explaining that "shared distrust of judges" was a "major influence" in
sentencing reform); see also Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Beyond Blakely, 16 FED. SENT. REP. 316,
318 (2004) ("The Sentencing Reform Act was the result of overwhelming bipartisan support for ending
disparities that occur at sentencing or at the parole stage."); id. at 328 n.62 ("Disparate sentences for
similarly situated defendants were based primarily upon geography, race, gender, and judicial
philosophy.").
41. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 367, 369 (noting that the Sentencing Reform Act created the
Commission "to devise guidelines to be used for sentencing" and to "promulgate determinative-
sentence guidelines"); see also STITH & CABRANES, supra note 17, at 2 (claiming that "the most far-
reaching and dramatic provision of the Sentencing Reform Act [was] the charge to the newly
established Sentencing Commission to develop and implement a system of mandatory sentencing
guidelines").
42. Professor Frank 0. Bowman, Ill succinctly described the axes:
The Criminal History Category on the horizontal axis of the Sentencing
Table is a rough effort to quantify the defendant's disposition to criminality,
which is reflected in the number and nature of his prior contacts with the criminal
[Vol. 56:533
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adjusts the severity of a potential sentence based upon the defendant's past criminal
record. 3 The vertical axis "reflects a base severity score for the crime committed,
adjusted for those characteristics of the defendant's criminal behavior that the
Sentencing Commission has deemed relevant to sentencing."" As one can see in
the Sentencing Table at Exhibit A, the more serious the offense and the more
extensive the defendant's criminal history, the longer the sentence.
law. The Offense Level on the vertical axis of the Sentencing Table is a
measurement of the seriousness of the present crime. The offense level
customarily has three components: (1) a "base offense level," (2) a set of "specific
offense characteristics," and (3) additional adjustments under Chapter Three of
the guidelines. The base offense level is a seriousness ranking based purely on
the fact of conviction of a particular statutory violation. For example, all fraud
convictions carry a base offense level of 6. The "specific offense characteristics"
are an effort to categorize and account for commonly occurring factors that cause
us to think of one crime as worse than another. They "customize" the crime. For
example, the Guidelines differentiate between a mail fraud in which the victim
loses $1,000 and a fraud with a loss of $1,000,000. A loss of $1,000 would
produce no increase in the base offense level for fraud of 6, while a loss of
$1,000,000 would add eleven levels and thus increase the offense level from 6 to
17.
Bowman, supra note 34, at 306 (footnotes omitted).
43. Id.; see also STITH & CABRANES, supra note 17, at 3.
44. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 17, at 3; see also Bowman, supra note 34, at 306.
9
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EXHIBIT A
SENTENCING TABLE
45
(IN MONTHS OF IMPRISONMENT)
CRIMINAL HISTORY CATEGORY (CRIMINAL HISTORY POINTS)
I II III IV V VI
(0or 1) (2 or 3) (4,5,6) (7,8,9) (10,11,12) (13 or more)
Offenses
Level
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
0-6
0-6
0-6
0-6
0-6
0-6
0-6
0-6
4-10
6-12
8-14
10-16
12-18
15-21
18-24
21-27
24-30
27-33
30-37
33-41
37-46
41-51
46-57
51-63
57-71
63-78
70-87
78-97
87-108
97-121
108-135
121-151
135-168
151-188
168-210
188-235
210-262
235-292
262-327
292-365
324-405
360-life
Life
0-6
0-6
0-6
0-6
0-6
1-7
2-8
4-10
6-12
8-14
10-16
12-18
15-21
18-24
21-27
24-30
27-33
30-37
33-41
37-46
41-5i
46-57
51-63
57-71
63-78
70-87
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45. U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, pt. A (Nov. 2004) [hereinafter Sentencing Table].
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A series of sometimes-complicated calculations under the Guidelines manual
determines a defendant's particular "location" on the grid, ' a set of instructions that
Professor Stith and Judge Cabranes pejoratively compared to the Internal Revenue
Code.47 The term "Guidelines," before the radical change that Booker B wrought,
was effectively a misnomer, because the United States Code mandated the
imposition of sentences within narrowly prescribed ranges.48 For example, absent
an allowable departure, a judge confronted with a defendant who has an Offense
Level of twenty-two and no Criminal History points (Criminal History Category I),
would have been required to sentence the defendant to a sentence of between forty-
one and fifty-one months.49
The sentencing statute permits departures from the Guidelines only when the
court finds "an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not
adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating
the guidelines . ".5.0"
46. See Bowman, supra note 34, at 306; see also STITH & CABRANEs, supra, note 17, at 3 ("The
Guidelines, through a complex set of rules requiring significant expertise to apply, instruct the
sentencing judge on how to calculate each of these factors.").
47. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 17, at 3 (noting that the Guidelines Manual consists of
"more than nine hundred pages of technical regulations and amendments, weighing close to five
pounds-which may be usefully compared to, for example, the Internal Revenue Code, which weighs
in at just under four pounds") (footnote omitted).
Stith and Cabranes's criticism notwithstanding, a useful exercise is to envision a world of taxation
without the predictability the Internal Revenue Code provides. Imagine, instead, that the law required
all income earners to provide their statements of earnings and household expenses to tax judges, who
were empowered to tax each earner at a rate ranging from zero to fifty percent, at the tax judge's
discretion and without an explanation. A citizen paying $25,000 would be justifiably outraged to learn
that his similarly-situated neighbor had only been assessed a $100 tax. This system would not be unlike
sentencing before the Guidelines.
48. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2000) (mandating application of Guidelines sentence). Note that
Booker B has severed this provision. Before Booker B, the Court and commentators recognized that
"[w]hile the products of the Sentencing Commission's labors have been given the modest name
'Guidelines,' ... they have the force and effect of laws, prescribing the sentences criminal defendants
are to receive." Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,413 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also id. at 367
(noting that the Judiciary Committee "rejected a proposal that would have made the sentencing
guidelines only advisory"). "Despite the use of the term guidelines, the sentencing rules issued by the
Sentencing Commission are binding on the federal judiciary." STITH & CABRANES, supra note 17, at
2.
49. See Sentencing Table, Exhibit A, supra note 45. Furthermore, as the forty-one to fifty-one
month range demonstrates, the highest point of the range is no greater than twenty-five percent more
than the lowest point of the range. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 368 ("The maximum of the range
ordinarily may not exceed the minimum by more than the greater of 25% or six months ....") (citations
omitted); see also STITH & CABRANES, supra note 17, at 3 (explaining that "the sentencing range in each
box is small, the highest point being 25 percent more than the lowers point").
50. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2000); see Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 97 (1996) (addressing
proper issues for departure and establishing that courts of appeals should review district courts'
departures under an "abuse of discretion" standard, as Congress did not wish to give appellate courts
"wide-ranging authority over district court sentencing decisions"); United States v. Headley, 923 F.2d
1079 (3d Cir. 1991). The Commission has provided that district courts are to "treat each guideline as
carving out a 'heartland,' a set of typical cases embodying the conduct that each guideline describes,"
and to consider a departure only when confronted with "an atypical case, one to which a particular
guideline linguistically applies but where conduct significantly differs from the norm." U.S.S.G., ch.
1, pt. A, introductory cmt. at 4(b) (Nov. 2004).
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One of the more controversial features of the Guidelines is their contemplation
of a version of "real offense sentencing,"'" which requires a judge to sentence a
defendant based upon the totality of the defendant's conduct, not just the offense
with which the defendant is charged. The notion that a defendant's sentence is
based upon his "real offense," however, begs the questions: "real" according to
whom, and according to what standard? Before Apprendi and Blakely, the judge
made the critical findings about what the defendant did, based on a "preponderance
of the evidence" standard.52 As Professor Mark Osler has argued, "fact-finding was
historically a function of trial, and its shift to sentencing has resulted in an
unsettling loss of rights."53 This concern goes to the heart of Blakely as the Booker
A majority further expressed, and yet Booker B contemplates that judicial fact-
finding will continue apace.
At sentencing, the judge is directed to consider all of the defendant's "relevant
conduct." In some instances, the judge's findings will necessarily go beyond the
scope of a jury's guilty verdict or those facts which a defendant may have admitted
at the plea hearing or sentencing.5 4 For example, even if the evidence introduced
at trial was limited to powder cocaine, at sentencing the judge may find that the
defendant also distributed heroin in connection with the overall drug distribution
scheme."5 More dramatically, the Guidelines contemplate that a judge disregard a
jury's acquittal of a defendant of certain conduct and determine a sentence with
51. See generally Julie R. O'Sullivan, In Defense of the US. Sentencing Guidelines' Modified
Real-Offense System, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1342 (1997) (describing real-offense aspects of the
Guidelines); see also David Yellen, Just Desserts and Lenient Prosecutors: The Flawed Case for Real-
Offense Sentencing, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1434, 1436-39 (1997) (criticizing real-offense sentencing).
52. See United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997).
53. Mark Osler, Must Have Got Lost: Traditional Sentencing Goals, the False Trail of Uniformity
and Process, and the Way Back Home, 54 S.C. L. REV. 649, 652 (2003).
54. Section lB 1.3 of the Guidelines sets forth the "Relevant Conduct" provision, which directs
the sentencing judge to consider:
(A) all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded,
induced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant; and
(B) in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity (a criminal plan, scheme,
endeavor, or enterprise undertaken by the defendant in concert with others,
whether or not charged as a conspiracy), all reasonably foreseeable acts and
omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity,
that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, in
preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection
or responsibility for that offense ....
U.S.S.G. § lB 1.3 (Nov. 2004). "The relevant conduct provisions are designed to channel the sentencing
discretion of the district courts and to make mandatory the consideration of factors that previously
would have been optional." United States v. Witte, 515 U.S. 389, 402 (1995) (citation omitted).
55. The Witte court explained:
The relevant conduct provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines, like their criminal
history counterparts and the recidivism statutes... are sentencing enhancement
regimes evincing the judgment that a particular offense should receive a more
serious sentence within the authorized [statutory] range if it was either
accompanied by or preceded by additional criminal activity.
Id. at 403.
[Vol. 56: 533
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consideration of the acquitted conduct. 6 Blakely called such practices into
constitutional question.
III. THE ROAD TO BLAKELY
A. Apprendi and its Forerunners
The Court's decision four years ago in Apprendi v. New Jersey7 set the stage
forBlakeley. InApprendi, which other scholars and commentators have thoroughly
analyzed,5 the Court invalidated a sentencing enhancement that was based upon
ajudicial finding that Apprendi committed a hate crime. The Court held that juries,
rather than judges, must find any facts, other than those related to recidivism, that
lead to an increase in the statutory maximum penalty for a crime."'
As commentator Freya Russell notes, "Apprendi drew on two lines of Supreme
Court cases that grapple with the issues of what must be proven in order to sentence
a defendant, when and by whom it must be proven, and what standard of proof
should govern the proceeding."'  The first line of cases deals with what the
government must prove at trial; the second treats sentencing proceedings as
requiring different constitutional protections.6 ' Therefore, whereas In re Winship62
established the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard as the familiar standard of
proof governing criminal trials, McMillan v. Pennsylvania63 held that the lower
evidentiary standard of a preponderance of the evidence can apply at sentencing
56. See United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997); see also United Sates v. Pineiro, 377 F.3d
464 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, vacated and remanded, 125 S. Ct. 1003 (2005). In Pineiro, the judge
found that the defendant was responsible for distributing 453.6 kilograms of marijuana and more than
a kilogram of cocaine, even though the jury had explicitly found that the defendant had distributed
"'less than fifty kilograms' of marijuana and '50 grams or less' of cocaine." Id. at 466. Professor David
Yellen has been particularly critical of this feature of the Guidelines:
[li]t has been my experience that almost every lay person, regardless of political
inclination, is shocked to learn that a federal judge must increase a sentence based
on conduct for which the defendant has been acquitted. I believe the reason for
this shock is the intuitive judgment that society's right to punish an individual
flows directly from, and is limited by, the conduct for which that individual has
been convicted. In Professor O'Sullivan's world [see supra note 51] (and the
Sentencing Commission's), just deserts becomes a free floating rationale not
anchored to the legal process of conviction.
Yellen, supra note 51, at 1437. See generally Barry L. Johnson, If at First You Don't
Succeed-Abolishing the Use of Acquitted Conduct in Guidelines Sentencing, 75 N.C. L. REV. 153
(1996) (proposing that the Sentencing Commission should change Guidelines to delete enhancements
for acquitted conduct).
57. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
58. For particularly thorough treatment of Apprendi, including a full discussion of the concurring
and dissenting opinions, see Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in
a World of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097, 1115-23 (2001), and Freya Russell, Note, Limiting the
Use ofAcquitted and Uncharged Conduct at Sentencing: Apprendi v. New Jersey and Its Effect on the
Relevant Conduct Provision of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1199,1202-08
(2001).
59. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
60. Russell, supra note 58, at 1208.
61. Id.
62. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
63. 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
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and satisfy due process requirements.' In Apprendi, Justice Stevens noted that the
McMillan Court "coined the term 'sentencing factor' to refer to a fact that was not
found by a jury but that could affect the sentence imposed by the judge.
65
Professor Stephanos Bibas argues that, for the past thirty years, the Court "has
struggled to explain which facts are elements of crimes and which are sentencing
factors."" The Court traditionally gave legislatures broad latitude to label potential
"aggravators" as either elements of crimes-which would require proof to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt-or sentencing factors, which judges could determine
on a preponderance standard.6 7 In Apprendi, however, the Court rejected the New
Jersey legislature's labeling choice that made the defendant's racial animus a
sentencing factor. As the majority reasoned, "[tihe defendant's intent in
committing a crime is perhaps as close as one might hope to come to a core
criminal offense 'element.'"6 Apjrendi, in turn, built upon the Supreme Court's
decision in Jones v. United States, 9 in which the Court reversed a sentence that was
enhanced based upon a judge's finding that the defendant caused "serious bodily
injury" during the course of a carjacking.7° As the Court said in Apprendi:
64. See Russell, supra note 58, at 1208, 1210 (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970);
McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986)).
65. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 485 (2000).
66. Bibas, supra note 58, at 1102. "Elements must be charged in an indictment and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury. Sentencing factors, in contrast, are entrusted to the sentencing
judge under a lower standard of proof." Id. (footnotes omitted). The distinction between the two is of
fairly recent vintage. As the Court pointed out in Apprendi, any such distinction "was unknown to the
practice of criminal indictment, trial by jury, and judgment by court as it existed during the years
surrounding our Nation's founding." Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 478.
67. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 85 (noting that the "legislature's definition of the elements of the
offense is usually dispositive"); see also Bibas, supra note 58, at 1102 (observing that "the Court has
repeatedly recognized that legislatures have broad latitude to define crimes and punishments") (footnote
omitted). But see Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 501 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[]f the legislature defines some
core crime and then provides for increasing the punishment of that crime upon a finding of some
aggravating fact.., the core crime and the aggravating fact together constitute an aggravated crime");
id. at 518 (Thomas, J., concurring) (remarking that "McMillan began a revolution in the law regarding
the definition of 'crime"' and that "[t]oday's decision, far from being a sharp break with the past, marks
nothing more than a return to the status quo ante-the status quo that reflected the original meaning of
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments").
68. Id. at 493.
69. 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
70. The Jones case was the subject of close analysis by both Bibas, supra note 58, at 1111-15,
and Russell, supra note 58, at 1211-13. Jones was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1998), the
subsections of which provided for different maximum sentences depending upon the nature of the
bodily injury, if any, that the defendant inflicted. Though the indictment did not identify a subsection,
and while the jury did not receive a charge on bodily injury, the judge handed down a twenty-five year
sentence upon a finding that the defendant caused serious bodily injury. The Supreme Court "conceded
that, at first glance, the body of § 2119 appeared to contain all the elements and the subsections
appeared to be mere sentencing factors," but found that the subsections providing for enhanced
sentences in the event of serious bodily injury or death "provided for much higher penalties and
conditioned them on further important facts." Bibas, supra note 58, at 1112 (footnote omitted). The
Supreme Court ultimately "reversed the defendant's sentence, holding that the statute should be read
as setting out three distinct offenses ...." Russell, supra note 58, at 1212.
As Bibas and Russell further note, footnote six of the Jones opinion "identified the principle that
became the [elements] rule: 'any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty
for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable
doubt."' Russell, supra note 58, at 1213 (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999));
see also Bibas, supra note 58, at 1114 ("The Court conceded that today, not every fact that affects
sentencing must be found by a jury. In footnote six, however, the Court suggested the elements
[Vol. 56:533
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[O]ur reexamination of our cases in this area, and of the history
upon which they rely, confirms the opinion that we expressed in
Jones. Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.7
This notion, first explicitly articulated in Jones, has been at the heart of the Court's
analysis in Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker.
In a dissenting opinion in Apprendi, Justice O'Connor forcefully criticized the
majority's analysis and predicted severe consequences for determinate sentencing
schemes such as the Guidelines.72
B. Apprendi in the Lower Courts
In the aftermath of Apprendi, however, most lower federal courts adopted an
interpretation that significantly limited its impact on the Guidelines before Blakely.
By reading Apprendi to apply only to cases involving effects on the maximum
statutory sentence, courts left most Guidelines calculations unaffected.
Under this interpretation of Apprendi, courts may think of the maximum
sentencing provisions in every criminal statute as containing the "outer boundaries"
rule....") (footnote omitted).
Both Bibas and Russell contrast Jones to the Court's decision the prior year in Almendarez-Torres
v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), in which the Court afrunmed a sentence under a similar statutory
scheme where the "aggravating factor" was the prior commission of a felony. In that case, the Court
held that recidivism, "perhaps the most traditional sentencing factor," need "not be an element of the
offense." Bibas, supra note 58, at 1108; see also Russell, supra note 58, at 1211 (noting that the
Almendarez-Torres Court relied upon McMillan in finding that the "penalty clause was a sentencing
factor" and further found "that it is normally Congress' role to decide which factors are elements and
which are sentencing factors") (footnotes omitted).
Interestingly, Bibas points out that the line-ups of justices in the Jones and Almendarez-Torres
cases were almost exactly reversed:
Jones was the mirror image of Almendarez-Torres. Four members of the
Almendarez-Torres majority [Kennedy, Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Breyer]
repeated their arguments in dissent in Jones. They wanted to defer to legislatures,
stressed traditional leeway forjudicial fact-finding at sentencing, and forecast that
the elements rule would cause grave practical problems. Conversely, the Jones
majority copied the Almendarez-Torres dissent. These Justices distrusted
legislatures and judges, exalted juries, relied on traditions ofjury fact-finding, and
adopted a strong rule of construction to avoid constitutional doubts.
Bibas, supra note 58, at 1115.
71. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
72. Id. at 544 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). For a fuller discussion of the O'Connor dissent, see
Bibas, supra note 58, at 1120-22; Russell, supra note 58, at 1207. Criticism of the analysis of the
Apprendi majority is beyond the scope of this article. Others have strongly articulated the view that
"Apprendi is wrong." See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Apprendi in the States: The Virtues of Federalism as
a Structural Limit on Errors, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 12 (2003) ("Apprendi's abstract
principle undervalues the benefits of insulated, expertjudicial sentencing."). Because the Court adhered
to the holding of Apprendi in both Blakely and Booker, this Article takes Apprendi's underlying
rationale as a given in current jurisprudence. Notably, Chief Justice Rehnquist, who may soon retire,
was an Apprendi dissenter, not a member of its majority.
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or "hard constraints" of sentencing,73 as Table 2 below represents.74 The black-
shaded areas represent the prohibited zones in which a court cannot sentence a
defendant. For example, the prohibited zone for a defendant convicted under
Subsection 841(b)(1)(C) is more than twenty years.
Table 2
Statutory Boundaries, Title 21
Narcotics Distribution
841(1bY){541(bl{ IeX,
841 (b I C)G20
Defendants did receive some benefit from Apprendi in that it set some outer
limits on sentences,75 but Apprendi did not lead to radically lower sentences. This
result is attributable in part to the significant statutory maximum sentences federal
criminal statutes provide. Had courts interpreted Apprendi more broadly to prohibit
even upward adjustments to the otherwise applicable Guidelines range within the
statutory boundaries, its effect would have been more far-reaching.
73. Note, however, that Justice O'Connor also referred to the Guidelines as themselves imposing
"hard constraints." See Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2550 (2004) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(referring to "hard constraints found throughout chapters 2 and 3 of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines .... ).
74. The table reflects the penalty provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)-(C) (2000).
75. 1 should acknowledge that not all commentators would concede that Apprendi "benefited"
defendants. Most notably, Stephanos Bibas provocatively argues that Apprendi does not provide the
benefits to defendants that are largely assumed, because most defendants plead guilty, and, in Bibas's
view, may receive less meaningful sentencing hearings in the wake of Apprendi. See Bibas, supra note
58, at 1152-67. In his words,
[t]he idea that rights can hurt defendants and deprive them of hearings is counterintuitive.
But the elements rule does more than confer new rights; in effect, it mandates that
enhancements be tried at trial if at all. In doing so, it takes away the more valuable right to
try enhancements at sentencing after pleading guilty.
Id. at 1152 (footnote omitted). In my view, the better argument is made by Professors King and Klein.
See Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Apprendi and Plea Bargaining, 54 STAN. L. REv. 295, 296
(2001). They argue that:
By raising the burden of proof, Apprendi makes it much more difficult for the prosecutor to
prove aggravating facts that trigger longer sentences. If the prosecutor couldn't successfully
convince the defendant to admit to the aggravating fact prior to Apprendi, his chances of
successfully convincing the defendant to admit to it after Apprendi are lower, not higher.
[Vol. 56: 533
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The prevailing view limiting Apprendi's impact was not without its critics. As
Professor Stephanos Bibas argued even before Blakely, Apprendi suggested that
judges should not make any factual findings leading to sentencing
enhancements-whether under the Guidelines or the relevant statute. In his words,
"[t]here is no logical difference between enhancing maxima set by Congress and
maxima set by the Sentencing Commission. '76  Applying Apprendi to the
Guidelines, however, "could invalidate hundreds of thousands if not millions of
federal and state guideline sentences. These staggering practical consequences will
likely deter the Court from extending the elements rule to its logical conclusion."
71
As Douglas Berman noted in his article about Blakely's aftershocks, "most
observers... thought that the Supreme Court would use Blakely to rule, as had
nearly all lower courts, that Apprendi had no applicability to judicial fact-finding
which simply impacted guidelines sentencin outcomes within otherwise applicable
statutory ranges. But then the big one hit."s
C. Blakely v. Washington
1. The Underlying Case
Defendant Ralph Blakely, Jr. was a paranoid schizophrenic who kidnapped his
estranged wife after she filed for divorce.79 He bound her with duct tape, threatened
her with a knife, and forced her into a box in his pickup truck. Blakely ordered the
couple's son, age thirteen, to follow the truck in a separate car and claimed he
would harm the boy's mother if the boy did not comply. The son escaped from the
situation during a stop at a gas station, but Blakely continued on with his estranged
wife and went to a friend's house. The friend called the police, and Blakely was
subsequently arrested."
Although the State initially charged Blakely with first-degree kidnapping,
Blakely pled guilty to second-degree kidnapping "involving domestic violence and
use of a firearm," a Class B felony."' In his guilty plea, Blakely admitted nothing
beyond the bare facts underlying the charged crime.8 2
Under the terms of the plea, the contemplated sentencing range was forty-nine
to fifty-three months, reflecting the "standard range" for a second-degree
kidnapping involving a firearm. 3 Before imposing a sentence, however, the court
heard testimony from the kidnapping victim. The judge then imposed a higher
sentence of ninety months after finding an "exceptional sentence" justified, because
76. Bibas, supra note 58, at 1148; see also Russell, supra note 58, at 1229 (arguing that the logic
of Apprendi means that judges should not use uncharged and unproven offenses to enhance sentences
within the relevant conduct provision of the Guidelines).
77. Bibas, supra note 58, at 1148 (footnote omitted). Bibas also has noted that the impact of
Apprendi was limited in the states. See Bibas, supra note 72, at 1.
78. Berman, supra note 12, at 308. While the Court's Blakely decision did appear to take Apprendi
to its logical conclusion, a majority of the Court balked at applying the force of that logic to the
Guidelines in Booker. By recharacterizing the Guidelines as "advisory," the Court is struggling
mightily to avoid the "staggering" impact to which Professor Bibas refers.
79. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2534 (2004).
80. Id.
81. Id. Blakely pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement with the Government. See id.
82. Id. at 2535.
83. Id.
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Blakely had acted with "'deliberate cruelty"' in committing the kidnapping
offense.84
2. Washington 's Sentencing Scheme
One provision of Washington state law provided for a maximum penalty of ten
years' confinement for Class B felonies." As Justice Scalia noted in his majority
opinion, however, other provisions of Washington's sentencing law further
constrained the sentencing range.86 Washington's sentencing scheme thus bore
strong similarities to the Guidelines in providing narrower ranges, binding on
judges, within the broader statutory framework.
87
Under Washington's law, the sentencing judge could impose a sentence higher
than the standard range only upon finding "'substantial and compelling reasons
justifying an exceptional sentence."' The Act listed illustrative aggravating
factors, including acting with "deliberate cruelty" in cases such as Blakely's."9 A
judge who imposed such an "exceptional sentence" was required to make factual
findings and legal conclusions to support the sentence imposed.90 An aggravated
sentence under this scheme was appropriate only if based upon factors independent
of those "'used in computing the standard range sentence for the offense. '9'
3. The Majority's Analysis
In analyzing the defendant's sentence in Blakely, the Court strictly applied the
Apprendi v. New Jersey rule: "Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact
that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum
must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."9 The Court
found that the sentencing judge in Blakely violated Apprendi by imposing, without
benefit ofjury findings or the defendant's admission, a sentence that was more than
three years longer than the fifty-three-month sentence prescribed as the maximum
of the "standard range" (forty-nine to fifty-three months) for second-degree
kidnapping with a firearm.93 The Court found a violation of the defendant's Sixth
Amendment rights despite the fact that the sentence was within the statutory
maximum term of ten years for Class B felonies.
The State argued that Blakely's sentence was consistent with Apprendi,
because the relevant "statutory maximum" was ten years. The Court rejected this
84. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2535 (2004) (citing WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9.94A.390(2)(h)(iii) (2000)). The defendant objected to the increase in his contemplated sentence,
and the judge then conducted a three-day hearing in which he heard from several witnesses. At the
conclusion of that hearing, he issued a series of factual findings and adhered to his initial sentencing
determination. Id. at 2535-36.
85. Id. at 2535 (citing WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.20.021(1)(b) (2000)).
86. Id.
87. See supra Part ll.B.
88. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2535 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 9.94A. 120(2) (2000)).
89. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2535 (2004) (citing WAsH. REV. CODE. ANN. §
9.94A.390(2)(h)(iii) (2000)).
90. Id. (citing WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.120(3) (2000)).
91. Id. (quoting State v. Gore, 21 P.3d 262, 277 (Wash. 2001)).
92. Id. at 2536 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)).
93. Id. at 2537.
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argument. Instead, the Court said: "Our precedents make clear that the
'statutory maximum' for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may
impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by
the defendant."94 The plain implication is that judicial fact-finding that increases
a sentence is barred, regardless of whether the increase is pursuant to statute or a
narrower Guidelines-type provision. As the Court explained: "[T]he relevant
'statutory maximum' is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after
finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional
findings.""5 The judge exceeds his authority and violates the defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to trial by jury when the judge "inflicts punishment that the jury's
verdict alone does not allow. .. ."
Significantly, the Court in no way suggested that the sentencing judge had done
anything other than comply with the sentencing scheme that Washington state
established.97 The State's sentencing procedure itself, however, violated the Sixth
Amendment.9"
The majority asserted that the Framers included a constitutional right to trial
by jury because "they were unwilling to trust government to mark out the role of
the jury."99 Once the legislature determines that certain facts require punishment,
a jury must fird those facts.
While conceding that indeterminate schemes also involve judicial fact-finding,
the Court noted that those facts "do not pertain to whether the defendant has a legal
right to a lesser sentence-and that makes all the difference insofar as judicial
impingement upon the traditional role of the jury is concerned."1" In the majority's
view, Blakely was sentenced to three years more than he should have been based
on the crime to which he pled guilty, and this error amounted to a constitutional
violation. As the Court stated:
The Framers would not have thought it too much to demand that, before
depriving a man of three more years of his liberty, the State should suffer
the modest inconvenience of submitting its accusation to 'the unanimous
94. Id. (citing Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 602 (2002)).
95. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2537 (2004).
96. Id.
97. See id. at 2535 ("A judge may impose a sentence above the standard range if he finds
'substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence."') (emphasis added) (citing
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A. 120(2) (2000)).
98. Id. at 2538.
99. Id. at 2540. The Court disputed the State's claim that it was, in effect, deconstitutionalizing
all determinate sentencing schemes. Rather, the Court said that Blakely dealt with the implementation
of such schemes in a manner consistent with the Sixth Amendment. Id.
100. Id. As others have noted, Justice Scalia's notion of a criminal defendant "bargaining" for
a particular sentence when he commits a crime contains a certain, implicit oddity-and perhaps a legal
fiction. In Scalia's view:
In a system that says the judge may punish burglary with 10 to 40 years, every
burglar knows he is risking 40 years in jail. In a system that punishes burglary
with a 10-year sentence, with another 30 added for use of a gun, the burglar who
enters a home unarmed is entitled to no more than a 10-year sentence-and by
reason of the Sixth Amendment the facts bearing upon that entitlement must be
found by jury.
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suffrage of twelve of his equals and neighbours,' rather than a lone
employee of the State.''
The Court, suggesting that its holding was an application rather than an
expansion of Apprendi, stated in a footnote that "[t]he Federal Guidelines are not
before us, and we express no opinion on them."' 2 After Blakely, however, and
before the Court ruled in Booker, a federal judge could not comply with Apprendi
and Blakely by simply continuing to follow the practice of making upward
adjustments under the Guidelines while staying within a broader statutory limit.1
03
Because imposition of the Guidelines was mandatory (with limited provisions for
departures), one could not determine the maximum authorized sentence, as defined
by Blakely, by consulting the internally-contained statutory penalty provisions
alone. Only by consulting the Guidelines themselves could one find what are, in
essence, the "standard ranges" and the enhanced ranges; the latter depend upon
judicial fact-finding, and therein lies the problem. This Guidelines procedure goes
to the heart of Blakely's concerns.
4. The Blakely Dissents
The Blakely decision generated three separate dissents. The first, Justice
O'Connor's,' ° bitterly lamented that her worst fearsoS had come to pass in Blakely:
"Over 20 years of sentencing reform are all but lost, and tens of thousands of
criminal judgments are in jeopardy.
1°6
O'Connor started her opinion by predicting that the inevitable result of the
majority opinion would be a "consolidation of sentencing power" in the judicial
branch, increasing judicial discretion and decreasing uniformity in sentencing. 7
She rejected the notion that the Framers would have found that either the Sixth
Amendment or the Due Process Clause required such a result, and predicted that the
consequences of the majority decision could prove "disastrous." '
Justice O'Connor then outlined the sentencing scheme that existed in
Washington prior to its Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, which she noted was like
the old federal system, characterized by "unguided discretion" leading to sentencing
disparities, including disparities "correlated with constitutionally suspect variables
such as race."'" Before sentencing reform, a defendant's sentence could be as
dependent upon a judge's idiosyncrasies as upon the background of the defendant
and the particulars of his crime. Sentencing reform acted to constrain judges'
discretion and, in the views of the dissenters, to serve the goals of due process and
101. Id. at 2543 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *343 [350]).
102. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2538 n.9 (2004).
103. See supra Part III.B.
104. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2543 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice Breyerjoined O'Connor's
dissent in its entirety, while Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy joined in part. Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy did not join Part IV-B of the O'Connor dissent, which specifically found
that the majority's opinion doomed the Guidelines.
105. Id. at 2550. Justice O'Connor first articulated this concern in Apprendi. See id. (citing
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 549-59 (2000) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 2543.
108. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2544 (2004) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 2544 (citation omitted).
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the right to a jury trial which the majority suggested Washington's new sentencing
scheme undermined.
O'Connor predicted high costs for preserving determinate sentencing schemes
in the wake of the majority's opinion." Factors that would enhance a sentence in
a system such as the Guidelines, "such as drug quantity, role in the offense, risk of
bodily hann-all must now be charged in an indictment and submitted to a
jury.... ,, O'Connor lamented the necessity of charging those same factors that
judges historically took into account when sentencing within broad statutory ranges,
"simply because it is the legislature, rather than the judge, that constrains the extent
to which such facts may be used to impose a sentence within a pre-existing
statutory range.""' 2 She also accused the majority of "doctrinaire formalism" in
rejecting Washington's scheme on Sixth Amendment grounds and expressed a
preference for a "balanced case-by-case approach" to constitutional challenges to
sentencing." 3 In her view, the majority's "rigid rule" would destroy the progress
sentencing reform brought. "4 Finally, O'Connor accused the majority of ignoring
"the havoc it is about to wreak on trial courts across the country.""I
s
Justices Kennedy and Breyer filed additional dissenting opinions." 6 All of the
dissents, however, fail to fully acknowledge how dramaticallyjudicial fact-finding
shapes a defendant's sentence under the current Guidelines regime, and the
implications of that system on a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights.
IV. BLAKELY'S IMPLICATIONS AND SEVERABILITY
A. Blakely's Implications
Blakely's implications are radical and far-reaching.' Judicial factual findings
that have an enormous impact on sentencing are a premise of the Guidelines
110. Id. at 2546.
111. Id. (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970))
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. O'Connor also took issue with the majority's claim to "the mantle of history and original
intent." Id. at 2548. Relying on her earlier dissent in Apprendi, she explained that broad sentencing
discretion was a concept unknown to the Framers; they never had to consider the constitutional
implications of a choice between "submitting every fact that increases a sentence to the jury or vesting
the sentencing judge with broad discretionary authority to account for differences in offense and
offenders." Id.
115. Id. at 2549. She identified a number of "unsettling" questions left open by the Court's
decision: "How are courts to mete out guidelines sentences? Do courts apply the guidelines as to
mitigating factors, but not as to aggravating factors? Do they jettison the guidelines altogether?"
Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2549 (2004) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 2550 and 2552. Breyer joined the Kennedy dissent and O'Connor the Breyer dissent.
Justice Breyer, as a primary author of the Guidelines, is particularly committed to them. See, e.g.,
Breyer, supra note 17; Brent Kendall, Justices Likely Will Strike Sentencing Guidelines, L.A. DAILY J.,
Oct. 5, 2004, at 1, 9.
117. Cf. Bibas, supra note 58, at 1123 (noting that, in Apprendi, "[tihe dissenters' tones of alarm
do not exaggerate the stakes. The elements rule will have sweeping effects, And the suggestions in the
concurrences would be more sweeping still."). In Blakely, the "more sweeping" suggestions of the
Apprendi concurrences became reality.
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system. The "real-offense" nature of Guidelines sentencing"' means that the
specific count of conviction often matters far less than the "real facts" the judge
finds." 9 As Professor Reitz explained, "[u]nder real-offense sentencing systems,
judges are given spacious authority to determine an offender's 'real' crimes."120
Blakely barred judges from making the key factual findings underlying
Guidelines sentences. At first blush, this outcome has a peculiar irony, especially
when one considers that judges have long lamented that the Guidelines have
stripped them of judicial discretion.' In Blakely, the Court stripped judges of
further authority. Where the Guidelines previously vested judges with the critical
decision-making role in sentencing, the Supreme Court found that locus of
authority unconstitutional and held that juries, not judges, must make the factual
fimdings that lead to increased sentencing ranges.'
On the other hand, and somewhat counter-intuitively, a system that gave judges
even more far-ranging authority would not run afoul of Blakely.23 In the pre-
Guidelines world of unlimited judicial discretion, a defendant convicted of
distributing 100 grams of powder cocaine faced a sentence of anywhere from
probation to twenty years' imprisonment. Anything ajudge deemed relevant could
form the basis for a sentence within that range. According to Blakely, however,
limiting the judge's discretion, and basing sentencing decisions within the statutory
range upon factual findings under a state guidelines scheme, ran afoul of the Sixth
Amendment. If factual findings called for higher sentencing ranges, then juries had
to find those facts. If, on the other hand, the judge simply used facts to decide a
118. As Justice (then Judge) Breyer described in his seminal article, supra note 17, at 10, "[a] 'real
offense' system... bases punishment on the elements of the specific circumstances of the case." For
a comprehensive discussion of the real-offense nature of Guidelines sentencing and a powerful defense
of same, see O'Sullivan, supra note 51. Notably, though disagreeing with many of her conclusions,
Professor David Yellen describes O'Sullivan's "well-developed defense" as "probably the best possible
case for including what I have called alleged-related offenses in the sentencing calculus." Yellen, supra
note 51, at 1434 (footnote omitted).
119. For example, in cases involving defendants convicted of distributing between 100 grams and
1 kilogram of cocaine, punishing two defendants identically seems wrong if Defendant A distributed
1 kilogram of cocaine to minor children, and carried a firearm while doing so, whereas Defendant B
distributed 100 grams of cocaine to adults, and did so unarmed. See O'Sullivan, supra note 51, at 1346
("[I]mposing a uniform tariff on all persons who violate an undifferentiated criminal code section,
although extremely costly in human and financial terms, will only in the most happenstantial way
further the purposes of criminal sentencing."). The question is, however, who should decide the "real
facts."
120. Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Facts: Travesties of Real-Offense Sentencing, 45 STAN. L. REV.
523, 524 (1993).
121. See generally STITH & CABRANES, supra note 17, at 89-90 (discussing many judges'
uneasiness with regard to Guidelines sentencing).
122. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2536-43 (2004); cf Bibas, supra note 58, at 1099
(footnote omitted) ("The elements rule holds that any fact that increases a defendant's statutory
maximum sentence must be an element of the offense. These facts must therefore be charged in an
indictment and proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt").
123. As Justice O'Connor noted in dissent,
[F]acts that historically have been taken into account by sentencing judges to
assess a sentence within a broad range-such as drug quantity, role in the offense,
risk of bodily harm-all must now be charged in an indictment and submitted to
a jury . . . simply because it is the legislature, rather than the judge, that
constrains the extent to which such facts may be used to impose a sentence within
a pre-existing statutory range.
Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2546 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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defendant's sentence within a discretionary range, no Sixth Amendment problem
arose.
One can think of the Blakely majority as allowing judges to exercise discretion,
but not to decide facts that then require sentencing within a higher range. As Judge
Posner explained:
[T]he issue in Blakely was not sentencing discretion-it was the
authority of the sentencing judge to find the facts that determine
how that discretion shall be implemented and to do so on the basis
of only the civil burden of proof. The vices of the guidelines are
thus that they require the sentencing judge to make findings of
fact (and to do so under the wrong standard of proof).'24
The pre-Booker Guidelines provisions that required judges to make the innumerable
factual findings leading to increased sentences plainly ran afoul of Blakely.
Struggling to work within the Guidelines framework before Booker decreed the
Guidelines advisory, lower court decisions applying Blakely to the Guidelines
generally fell into two broad camps: (1) those that severed Blakely-offending
features from the Guidelines and issued sentences based upon an eviscerated
Guidelines scheme 2 ' and (2) those that treated the Guidelines as non-severable and
viewed the system, in toto, as unconstitutional after Blakely."26 The Supreme Court
ultimately granted certiorari in two cases that effectively took the former approach.
B. Booker and Fanfan in the Lower Courts
On July 9, 2004, a split panel of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found
the sentencing judge's upward adjustments under the Guidelines unconstitutional
in United States v. Booker. 27 The case began when Freddie J. Booker was arrested
with 92.5 grams of crack cocaine in his duffel bag. 2 Booker claimed that he had
not put the drugs in his duffel bag and the case went to trial. 29 A jury found him
guilty of possession with intent to distribute at least fifty grams of cocaine base. 3 '
The crime of conviction was 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), which has a statutory
sentencing range of ten years to life. 3'
At trial, Booker only contested whether or not he placed the drugs in his bag,
and not the quantity of the drugs; therefore, the court found that the jury's guilty
verdict necessarily determined Booker had possessed 92.5 grams of crack, which,
124. United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508, 511 (7th Cir. 2004), affd and remanded, 125 S. Ct.
738 (2005).
125. See, e.g., United States v. Shamblin, 323 F. Supp. 2d 757, 768 (S.D. W. Va. 2004) (finding
a lower sentencing range "[b]ased on only those sentencing factors that [defendant] admitted during his
plea).
126. See, e.g., United States v. Croxford, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1242 (D. Utah 2004) (treating
"the Guidelines as unconstitutional in their entity in this case and sentenc[ing defedant] between the
statutory minimum and maximum"), adhered to by 324 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1265 (D. Utah 2004).
127. 375 F.3d 508 (7th Cir. 2004), affd and remanded, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
128. Id. at 509.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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at sentencing, yielded a base offense level of thirty-two."' Under the Guidelines,
that base offense level would have yielded a maximum sentence of 262 months for
an individual with Booker's criminal history. '3 However, at sentencing, the judge
found by a preponderance of the evidence that Booker had distributed an additional
566 grams of cocaine base, yielding an increased base offense level of thirty-six. 3 4
The sentencing judge also found Booker obstructed justice, further raising his
offense level.' 3 The resulting sentencing range was 360 months (30 years) to life;
the judge sentenced Booker to 30 years in prison.'36
Writing for the majority, Judge Posner found that a sentence reflecting such
upward adjustments under the Guidelines violated Blakely's dictates." 7 Posner
found irrelevant the fact that the determination of the "maximum sentence" without
adjustments was by reference to the overlaying Guidelines, rather than by the terms
of a federal statute. 3 ' Like the statutory scheme at issue in Blakely, the Guidelines
established a "standard range" for Booker's offense and provided aggravating
factors that would, if a judge found them present, increase the range, as had
happened in this case.
39
Judge Posner rejected the Government's argument that the Guidelines could
survive the Court's ruling in Blakely.'" Although the Government argued that the
Guidelines simply "regularize discretion" thatjudges exercise in selecting sentences
within the statute-specific sentencing ranges, the court found the "vices" of the
Guidelines to lie in the requirement that judges find facts under a preponderance
of the evidence standard, which then result in a particular sentence."" The court
found that Blakely gives defendants the right to demand that a jury make such
findings under the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard: "The finding of facts
(other than the fact of the defendant's criminal history) bearing on the length of the
sentence," such as those the sentencing judge made in Booker, "is just what the
Supreme Court in Blakely has determined to be the province of the jury."' 4 2
Given the court's conclusion that the operation of the Guidelines in Booker's
case violated the Sixth Amendment under Blakely, Judge Posner next considered
the government's argument that this conclusion ran afoul of the Supreme Court's
earlier ruling in United States v. Edwards.43 In Edwards, decided before Apprendi,
132. Id.
133. United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508, 510 (7th Cir. 2004), affd and remanded, 125 S. Ct.
738 (2005).
134. Id. at 509.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 515.
138. Id. at510-11.
139. United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508, 511 (7th Cir. 2004), affid and remanded, 125 S. Ct.
738 (2005).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 511-12. The court agreed that sentencingjudges retain some limited discretion to sentence
outside of the Guidelines. See id. at 511. "But the issue in Blakely was not sentencing discretion-it was
the authority of the sentencing judge to find the facts that determine how that discretion shall be implemented
and to do so on the basis of only the civil burden of proof." Id.
142. Id. at512.
143. 523 U.S. 511 (1998). The Booker court noted, "We are mindful... that the lower federal
courts are not to overrule a Supreme Court decision even if it seems manifestly inconsistent with a
subsequent decision, unless the subsequent decision explicitly overruled the earlier one." United States
v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508, 513 (7th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted), affd and remanded, 125 S. Ct. 738
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the Supreme Court considered whether the Guidelines permit the sentencing judge,
rather than the jury, to determine the kind and quantity of drugs involved in a drug
conspiracy. In Edwards the Court unanimously held that the Guidelines "require
the judge" to make such findings;' the Court construed statutory language and did
not squarely address the Sixth Amendment implications of the Guidelines'
requirement of judicial fact-finding.1
45
In Booker, the Government argued that Edwards upheld the Guidelines
"against a Sixth Amendment challenge,"'" meaning that the lower courts were
constrained to follow Edwards with respect to current Sixth Amendment challenges
to the Guidelines. The Booker majority, however, rejected the Government's
interpretation of Edwards and found that Edwards did not deal directly with a Sixth
Amendment challenge.
47
The court found that Edwards did not apply and that Booker had a post-Blakely
right to have a jury determine the drug quantity and the facts necessary for an
obstruction of ustice enhancement. The Seventh Circuit remanded the case for
resentencing.' Because a sentence of 262 months would have been consistent
with the verdict without consideration of the sentencingjudge's additional findings,
Judge Posner suggested sentencing Booker to that term as one option on remand.1
49
If, on the other hand, the Government wanted a higher sentence, or if the lower
court determined that the Guidelines were not severable, then Booker would be
entitled to a sentencing hearing before a jury. 5 '
In United States v. Fanfan,"' the district court found unconstitutional, after
Blakely, the application of any Guidelines sentencing enhancements based on drug
quantities bey'ond those the jury found, or the application of any role
enhancement. "
Although the judge stated that he would have imposed a pre-Blakely Guidelines
sentence of between 188 and 235 months (corresponding to a level thirty-six), after
Blakely, he found himself limited to sentencing the defendant based upon the
quantity of drugs implicit in the jury's verdict, which was 500 grams of powder
cocaine."'5 That quantity yielded an offense level of twenty-six and a sentencing
range of sixty-three to seveny eight months: "[i]n other words, five or six years
instead of 15 or 16 years." 14 Quoting Blakely, the court concluded that this
significantly shorter sentence "would not bother the Blakely court."' 55 Rather, the
sentencing judge quoted the Supreme Court as follows:
(2005).
144. Edwards, 523 U.S. at 514.
145. Id. at 516.
146. Booker, 375 F.3d at 513.
147. Id. at 514.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 515.
150. Id. at514.
151. No. 03-47-P-H, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18593 (D. Me. June 28, 2004), vacated and remanded
sub nom. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
152. Id. at* 12.
153. See id. at *4-7.
154. Id. at *5.
155. Id. at *7.
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"The Framers would not have thought it too much to demand that,
before depriving a man of three more years of his liberty, the
State should suffer the modest inconvenience of submitting its
accusation to 'the unanimous suffrage of twelve of his equals and
neighbours,' rather than a lone employee,.., of the State." '156
In the case before the district court, moreover, "we're talking about much more
than three years.""' Referring to Fanfan as "the ring leader of a significant drug
conspiracy,"'58 the court sentenced him to the maximum term of seventy-eight
months under the range the judge found applicable after Blakely.5 9
C. The Supreme Court's Booker Decision6'
1. Booker A-Applying Blakely to the Guidelines
In a relatively straightforward and predictable application of Blakely, the
Booker majority held that the lower courts in both Booker and Fanfan correctly
concluded that the Sixth Amendment applies to the Guidelines.'6 ' In the Booker A
opinion, written by Justice Stevens and joined by Justices Scalia, Souter, Thomas,
and Ginsburg, the Court emphasized the mandatory nature of the Guidelines. 62
Under the Guidelines system, "The effect of the increasing emphasis on facts that
enhanced sentencing ranges... was to increase the judge's power and diminish that
of the jury."'63
In rejecting the Government's argument that Blakely should not apply to the
Guidelines, the Court found constitutionally insignificant the fact that the
Sentencing Commission rather than Congress promulgated the Guidelines. In the
Court's words, "[iln order to impose the defendants' sentences under the
Guidelines, the judges in these cases were required to find an additional fact, such
as drug quantity, just as the judge found the additional fact of serious bodily injury
to the victim in Jones.' 164
The Court recognized,
156. Id. at *7 (quoting Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2543 (2004) (internal quotations
omitted)).
157. Id.
158. United States v. Fanfan, No. 03-47, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18593 *14 (D. Me. June 28,
2004), vacated and remanded sub nom. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
159. Id. at* 13-14.
160. The Supreme Court issued its decision in Booker after this Article's acceptance for publication
and just weeks before the Article's scheduled date to go to press. The discussion of Booker is, therefore,
necessarily brief and preliminary.
161. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 745 (2005).
162. ld. at 750.
163. Id. at 751.
164. Id. at 752. For a discussion of Jones, see supra note 70 and accompanying text. In Booker A,
the Court also rejected the Government's arguments that the doctrines of stare decisis and separation of
powers compelled a holding declining to extend Blakely to the Guidelines. See id. at 753-55. Among
other things, the Court, as had the court of appeals in Booker, rejected the Government's argument that
Edwards compelled the Court to limit Blakely's holding. See supra notes 143-48 and accompanying text.
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as we did in Jones, Apprendi, and Blakely,'65 that in some cases
jury factfinding may impair the most expedient and efficient
sentencing of defendants. But the interest in fairness and
reliability protected by the right to a jury trial-a common-law
right... that is now enshrined in the Sixth Amendment-has
always outweighed the interest in concluding trials swiftly.166
Accordingly, the Court reaffirmed its Apprendi holding that "[a]ny fact (other than
a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the
maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict
must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt."'
167
Critical to the Court's holding in Booker A was the fact that the Guidelines are
mandatory, such that they require sentencing within a relatively narrow range
within the broader statutory boundaries. As Table 1, reprinted below, illustrates,
the white zones represent the narrow Guidelines ranges within the broader statutory
limits. Because Blakely interpreted "maximum sentence" to include a maximum
established by a scheme analogous to the Guidelines, construing "maximum" more
narrowly to include only the maximum set by the outer statutory boundaries was
no longer possible after Blakely. Judicial fact-finding under the Guidelines has the
effect of moving the location of the white zone within the statutory range, in
essence leading to higher maximum sentences.'68
Table 1
Guidelines Ranges Within Statutory Boundaries
Cocaine DLktriution
S41( XA) 1"
941(b)I){B) ~A
I kilogiam
165. For discussion of Apprendi and Blakely, see supra Part HI.
166. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756.
167. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 756 (2005).
168. Of course, in some circumstances, judicial fact-finding under the Guidelines can lead to
lower sentences, but that result would not run afoul of Blakely. As a practical matter, most judicial fact-
finding leads to higher sentences under the Guidelines, as Croxford, Booker, and Fanfan illustrate. See
United States v. Croxford, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1255 (D. Utah 2004).
27
Darmer: The Federal Sentencing Guidelines After Blakely and Booker: The L
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
However, if the white zone represented only an "advisory range," it would not
include a "maximum authorized sentence." Rather, the maximum authorized
sentence would be the statutory maximum, which would be life imprisonment, forty
years, or twenty years, as the grey zones in Table 1, above, represent. This notion
was at the heart of the Court's "solution" in Booker B.
2. Booker B-The Fix
The Booker B majority, written by Justice Breyer and joined by the three other
Booker A dissenters plus Justice Ginsburg,"6 9 recast the Guidelines as "advisory"
in order to avoid the Sixth Amendment problem with mandatory Guidelines that
BookerA identified. Specifically, the Court found 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), which
makes the Guidelines mandatory, "incompatible with today's constitutional
holding" and severed that provision.' ° The court also struck 18 U.S.C. § 3 742(e),
which established a de novo standard of appellate review and was premised on the
Guidelines' mandatory nature.' With the Guidelines now only "advisory,"
sentencing judges can continue to make the factual findings that lead to increased
sentences-precisely because they are no longer required to do so in a way that
would run afoul of Blakely and Booker B. Sentencing judges must "consult" the
Guidelines but are not bound to apply them.172
In addressing severability, the Booker B majority claimed to be "answer[ing]
the remedial question by looking to legislative intent."'7 According to Booker B,
the remedy of severing the Guidelines mandatory provisions was more consistent
with Congress's intent than a remedy engrafting a jury trial requirement onto the
Guidelines. The Booker B majority concluded that Congress would have preferred
to invalidate the Sentencing Reform Act rather than impose a Sixth Amendment
requirement and would have preferred the majority's remedy to invalidation of the
Act.
74
Central to this conclusion was Booker B's analysis that "real offense
sentencing" is a cornerstone of the Guidelines and that only judges can effectively
determine the "real offense."'7 Requiring jury fact-fimding would "destroy the
system," according to the majority, by preventing a judge from relying upon
information uncovered after the trial and by tying sentences simply to charges
prosecutors brought, rather than to the facts underlying those charges.1
76
Looking specifically at the underlying facts of Booker, Justice Breyer noted
that "[a] system that would require the jury, not the judge, to make the additional
'566 grams' finding is a system in which the prosecutor, not the judge, would
control the sentence. That is because it is the prosecutor who would have to decide
what drug amount to charge.'
169. Professor Dershowitz has been harshly critical of Justice Ginsburg for "switching sides" and
taking inconsistent positions with no explanation. See Alan Dershowitz, Prima Donnas in Robes, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 17, 2005, at B11.
170. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756.
171. Id. at 764, 765.
172. Id. at 767.
173. Id. at 757 (citation omitted).
174. See id.
175. This proposition is dubious at best. See infra Part V.C.1.
176. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 760 (2005).
177. Id. at 763.
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In addition to recasting the Guidelines as advisory, the Court in Booker B also
excised Section 3742(e), the provision related to the standard of review of
appeals.'78 With that section excised, the Court found that the Sentencing Reform
Act contained an implicit standard of review for reasonableness.""
The Booker B majority acknowledged that the "reasonableness" standard might
not "provide the uniformity that Congress originally sought to secure. Nor do we
doubt that Congress wrote the language of the appellate provisions to correspond
with the mandatory system it intended to create."' 0 Nonetheless, the majority
found that retention of sentencing appeals "would tend to iron out sentencing
differences," whereas invalidating the Sentencing Reform Act entirely would not.'
Dealing with the two cases before it, the Court then affirmed the court of
appeals' decision in Booker and remanded it for resentencing, and vacated the
district court's sentence in Fanfan, the sole premise for which was the drug quantity
implicit in the jury verdict.'82 Presumably, the sentencing courts in both Booker
and Fanfan can now either follow the prescribed Guidelines sentences flowing from
the facts the sentencing judges find-or not.
3. The Booker Dissents
Justices filed dissenting opinions from both Booker A and Booker B. In his
dissent from Booker B, Justice Stevens"8 3 (who authored Booker A) asserted that
neither of the Court's majority opinions [Booker A nor Booker B] found any
provision of the Sentencing Reform Act inherently unconstitutional. He described
the Booker B majority's excision of provisions of the Act "a policy choice that
Congress has considered and decisively rejected."'"
Looking at the underlying facts of Booker's case, Stevens noted that the
sentencing judge's initial sentence of 360 months would have been consistent with
both the Guidelines and the Sixth Amendment if the jury, rather than the judge, had
made the findings regarding the additional 566 grams of crack.8 As Stevens
reasoned:
178. In 2003, the Feeney Amendment modified this section to provide for de novo review of
departures in order to reduce the number of departures from the Guidelines. If Guidelines are
"advisory," then the notion of a Guidelines "departure" is arguably irrelevant.
179. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 766-67.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 767.
182. Seeid. at 769.
183. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 771 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). Justice
Souter joined the Stevens dissent entirely, while Justice Scalia joined in part.
184. Id.
185. See id. at 772. Justice Stevens explained that four underlying factual determinations formed
the basis for Booker's underlying sentence:
(1) the jury's finding that [Booker] possessed 92.5 grams of crack (cocaine base);
(2) the judge's finding that he possessed an additional 566 grams; (3) the judge's
conclusion that he had obstructed justice; and (4) the judge's evaluation of his
prior criminal record.
Id. Had the jury made the finding of 566 grams, its findings as to the total amount of crack would have
authorized a sentence of between 324 and 405 months-a relatively broad range that would then have
permitted the judge to consider, in picking a sentence within that range, the defendant's "obstruction
of'justice, his criminal history, and all other real offense and offender factors without violating the Sixth
Amendment." Id.
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The principal basis for the Court's chosen remedy is its
assumption that Congress did not contemplate that the Sixth
Amendment would be violated by depriving the defendant of the
right to a jury trial on a factual issue as important as whether
Booker possessed the additional 566 grams of crack that
exponentially increased the maximum sentence that he could
receive. I am not at all sure that assumption is correct, but even
if it is, it does not provide an adequate basis for volunteering a
systemwide remedy that Congress has already rejected and could
enact on its own if it elected to.
11
6
Stevens criticized the majority for overbreadth, particularly in light of the
number of cases which pleas resolve (95%) and the number of cases that do not
involve sentencing enhancements." 7 Given that the Guidelines could apply in their
entirety to the majority of federal cases, he found that the Guidelines are not
facially invalid.' 8
Stevens emphasized that Blakely did not invalidate judicial fact-finding in toto.
Judicial factfmding is invalid only when it leads to a sentence greater than the
sentence that either the jury's findings or the defendant's admissions authorize.
Judicial fact-finding that simply moves a defendant within a range remains
constitutional after Blakely."8 9
Stevens found that "severability analysis" did not apply to this case, because
no provision of the Sentencing Reform Act or Guidelines "falls outside of
Congress's power."' While the provisions BookerB severed may result in a Sixth
Amendment violation when combined with other provisions, they are facially valid.
Justice Stevens harshly criticized the majority's severability approach:
There is no case of which I am aware... in which this Court has
used "severability" analysis to do what the majority does today:
determine that some unconstitutional applications of a statute,
when viewed in light of the Court's reading of "likely" legislative
intent, justifies the invalidation of certain statutory sections in
their entirety, their constitutionality notwithstanding, in order to
save the parts of the statute the Court deemed most important. 9'
Justice Stevens asserted that rather that rewriting the Sentencing Reform Act, he
would allow the Government to continue its post-Blakely practice of proving facts
required for sentencing enhancements to a jury.
Even under the severability approach, Justice Stevens found the majority's
reading of legislative intent unpersuasive. His review of the Sentencing Reform
Act emphasized the goal of reducing disparity, and he found unsupportable the
majority's view that Congress would prefer a system that retained "real offense
sentencing" by judges without mandatory Guidelines. "The notion that Congress
186. Id.
187. See United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 772 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
188. See id. at 774.
189. See id. at 775.
190. Id. at 777.
191. Id.
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had any confidence that judges would reduce sentencing disparities by considering
relevant conduct... either ignores or misreads the political environment in which
the SRA passed."' 92 Moreover, the Guidelines mandatory nature has always been
an essential element of the system, and "Congress has rejected each and every
attempt to loosen the rigidity of the Guidelines or vest judges with more sentencing
options."'93 Stevens concluded that Booker B's remedy fails to meet the goals of
Apprendi, "frustrates Congress' principal goal in enacting the SRA, and violates the
tradition of judicial restraint that has heretofore limited our power to overturn
validly enacted statutes." 94
In a separate dissent,195 Justice Scalia likewise viewed Booker B's remedy as
"misguided," given its focus on the "manner" of achieving uniformity (judicial fact-
finding) rather than the actual achievement of uniformity. 96 "The majority's
remedial choice is thus wonderfully ironic: In order to rescue from nullification a
statutory scheme designed to eliminate discretionary sentencing, it discards the
provisions that eliminate discretionary sentencing. " 97 Given the "notorious
unpopularity" of the Guidelines with many judges, Justice Scalia predicted a return
to the disparity characterized by pre-Guidelines sentencing.
Justice Thomas, also dissenting separately, 98 faulted the Booker B majority for
failing to tailor its remedy to the Sixth Amendment infirmity Booker A identified.
In his view, the proper course was to invalidate the statute as applied only insofar
as necessary to cure the defect. Applying that principle to the cases at hand,
Booker's initial sentence violated the Sixth Amendment, but Fanfan's did not.
Section 3553(b)(1), which the majority facially invalidated, "is entirely
constitutional in numerous other applications.'" Accordingly, Thomas would
have severed only the unconstitutional applications of the Guidelines scheme.2 °"
In their opinion dissenting from Booker A, Justice Breyer, whom Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy joined, relied on their earlier
dissents from Apprendi and Blakely and found that the Sixth Amendment did not
forbid sentencing judges to determine the manner in which a defendant committed
an offense.2"' The dissenters further found that Blakely and Apprendi, even if valid,
192. Id. at 785.
193. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 786 (2005) (Stevens, ., dissenting).
194. Id. at 789.
195. Id. at 789-95 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part).
196. Id. at 789.
197. Id. at 790.
198. Id. at 795-802 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part).
199. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 797 (2005) (Thomas J., dissenting in part).
200. Unlike Justice Stevens' approach, which found that severability analysis did not apply,
Justice Thomas explicitly found that severability did apply and that the presumption of severability had
not been overcome. Id. at 801. He agreed with Stevens, however, that Breyer's approach in Booker
B "grossly distorts severability analysis by using severability principles to determine which provisions
the Court should strike as unconstitutional." Id. at 800 n.10. Specifically, he criticized Breyer for
skipping the critical first step of "declar[ing] a provision or application unconstitutional, using
substantive constitutional doctrine (not severability doctrine)" and only then asking whether the rest of
the act can stand. Id.
Justices Stevens' and Thomas' approaches, while different, essentially reach the same result. An
analysis of the merits of their different conclusions as to severability qua severability is beyond the
scope of this Article.
201. Id. at 802 (Breyer, J., dissenting in part).
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"involved sentences embodied in a statute, not in administrative rules,"202 and thus
did not apply to the Guidelines.
V. A BETTER FIX TO THE GUIDELINES
A. Problems With Booker B
While Booker A was a natural outgrowth of the Court's recent jurisprudence,
Booker B produced ajarring result in attempting to salvage as many current features
of the Guidelines as possible while effecting an end-run around the Sixth
Amendment requirements Booker A recognized. At the same time, the majority
severed perhaps the most essential feature of the Guidelines-the provision making
them mandatory. As the dissenters noted, Congress expressly rejected the advisory
system Booker B created. While some judges may attempt to vindicate the goals
of the Guidelines in good faith,23 other judges will disagree about how closely to
follow the "advisory" Guidelines. Some judges will no doubt balk, post-Booker,
at making the factual findings that Booker B insists are critical to the system. A
judge may well, for example, pass "reasonableness review" on appeal by insisting,
per Booker A, that the Government must prove any factual findings leading to a
higher sentence to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Booker B dissenters argued persuasively that the majority's analysis was
flawed. The majority elevated above all else the solitary role of the judge in finding
the "real facts," and emphasized, as Justice Scalia noted, the "manner of achieving"
uniformity rather than the actual achievement of uniformity that was Congress's
overriding goal in passing the Sentencing Reform Act.2
The majority uncritically accepted the fairness of a system driven by judicial
fact-finding, and avoided the Sixth Amendment constraints ofBookerA, in essence,
by reverting to the pre-Guidelines world of open-ended discretion.2 5 Numerous
problems exist with Booker B's approach, which go beyond the most glaring
problem of returning to the pre-Guidelines days of disparity. Among other things,
advisory Guidelines will have the effect of blunting one of the most important tools
in a prosecutor's arsenal: Section 5KI.1, which provides that "[u]pon motion of the
government stating that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in the
investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense, the
court may depart from the guidelines." A defendant facing a high Guidelines
sentence previously had a strong incentive to cooperate with authorities in order to
get a prized 5K1.1 motion, allowing the judge to depart below the Guidelines.2 7
However, departures may prove meaningless in an advisory system; thus,
202. Id. at 806.
203. See United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910 (D. Utah 2005) (applying the Guidelines
post-Booker and urging other courts to do the same).
204. See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 790 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part).
205. As Professor Douglas Berman has recently argued, a system driven by judicial fact-finding
also raises due process concerns. Douglas A. Berman, Burdens of Proof and a New Due Process of
Sentencing, Sentencing Law and Policy, at http://sentencing.typepad.com (Jan. 21, 2005).
206. U.S.S.G. § 5K.lI (Nov. 2004).
207. For particularly thorough treatment of the cooperation system, see Michael A. Simons,
Retribution for Rats: Cooperation, Punishment, and Atonement, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1, 6-21 (2003).
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defendants may have a reduced incentive to cooperate with authorities in cases
where statutory mandatory minimum sentences do not apply.
20 8
Another obvious problem with the Booker B solution is that, while narcotics
defendants will continue to face statutory minimum sentences 2 9 that act as "hard
constraints" on judges, other defendants currently do not. This disparity will lead
to widely varied treatment of narcotics defendants as a group as compared to other
defendants and thus exacerbate the problem that already exists with harsh
mandatory minimum sentences in drug cases. In drug cases, both statutory
mandatory minimum sentences and Guidelines sentences are linked to quantity,
while in white collar crimes, Guidelines sentences are linked to loss amounts, but
no statutory mandatory minimum sentences apply. Because many judges believe
the Guidelines are too rigid, they will likely begin opting out of "advisory
Guidelines" in white collar crime cases, whereas they will be unable to do so in
narcotics cases to which statutory mandatory minimums apply.
Just two days after the Court handed down Booker, a district court judge
rejected the advisory Guidelines sentence in a white collar crime case, partly
because "[o]ne of the primary limitations of the guidelines, particularly in white-
collar cases, is their mechanical correlation between loss and offense level. ' '21* The
judge imposed a sentence that was less than one-third of the proposed Guidelines
sentence.2 1 Many more such cases will follow, with judges exercising reclaimed
discretion to abandon the Guidelines.
While many compelling arguments claim the Guidelines are too rigid and
draconian insofar as they link sentences to quantities in drug cases and loss amounts
in white collar criminal cases, Booker B allows for flexibility only in the latter
category. Indeed, drug cases-arguably the area in which the need for sentencing
reform is greatest-are the only category that Booker B leaves largely unaltered.
This observation raises fundamental fairness concerns; however, the concerns with
Booker B are largely academic, as Congress will not for long tolerate its
reinvigoration ofjudicial discretion in large categories of cases. As Justice Breyer
noted in his Booker B majority opinion, "The ball now lies in Congress' court.
212
B. Congressional Intolerance
The prevailing congressional attitude toward judicial discretion in sentencing
can be summed up in two words: Feeney Amendment. That 2003 legislation,
which further reined in judicial sentencing discretion by limiting downward
departures,2 a generated a "firestorm of protest" by the judiciary" 4 and the academy.
208. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2000), a judge may depart even below a statutory minimum
sentence if the Government attests that a defendant has provided substantial assistance. Defendants
retain the incentive to cooperate in cases where statutory mandatory minimum sentences apply, because
Booker B's holding regarding "advisory Guidelines" would not allow a judge to avoid an applicable
mandatory minimum sentence imposed by statute without a "substantial assistance" motion.
209. Narcotics defendants typically face statutory minimum sentences of five or ten years,
depending upon drug quantity. See supra Table 1.
210. United States v. Ranum, 353 F. Supp. 2d 984, 989 (E.D. Wis. 2005).
211. Id. at 985.
212. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 768 (2005).
213. Alan Vinegrad, the former United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York,
described the Feeney Amendment as follows:
In April 2003, Congress passed the most sweeping federal sentencing legislation
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Many of the arguments against the Feeney Amendment are compelling, but
congressional hostility toward discretionary sentencing is currently entrenched. A
more viable long-term alternative to the Booker B fix is to use the constitutional
problems Blakely identified as an opportunity to correct the Guidelines surgically
to extract some of the fundamental problems of the system while still working
within the requirement of limiting judicial discretion that Congress will surely
demand.
With the Feeney Amendment, Congress sent an unequivocal message of
distrust of judges with broad sentencing discretion. If even the limited downward
departure power the Feeney Amendment curtailed was unacceptable, Congress will
be even less likely to embrace a return to wide-ranging judicial discretion that is the
inevitable consequence of BookerB. Instead, Congress will likely see a "fix" to the
Guidelines that will comply with Blakely but also serve the legislative goal of
keeping a tight rein on judicial discretion. Booker B will not provide that solution.
The Booker B dissenters found the Guidelines in their entirety facially valid,
pointing out that prosecutors already were adapting to Blakely by alleging and
proving to juries beyond a reasonable doubt the facts required for sentencing
enhancements.2 15 While the Guidelines may be susceptible to an interpretation that
complies with the Sixth Amendment, such an understanding is not their most
natural reading. The Guidelines contemplate that judges will fird facts that lead to
increased sentencing ranges, even though operation without that feature is possible.
Thus, while the dissenters were absolutely right not to undertake a rewriting of the
Guidelines, Congress would have needed to make changes to the Guidelines in light
of Booker A even had the Booker B dissenters carried the day and left the
Guidelines intact.
C. Proposed Changes
The Booker B decision made Congressional action not just preferable, but
inevitable. While a line-by-line or section-by-section menu of suggested changes
to the Guidelines to conform to Blakely and Booker is beyond the scope of this
Article, a logical step is to take a chapter-by-chapter approach to propose specific
changes that will vindicate the Sixth Amendment but also recognize the practical
and political constraints on wholesale Guidelines reform." 6
A number of caveats accompany these proposals. One is that they are
necessarily preliminary, given the freshness of the Court's Blakely and Booker
since the creation of the Sentencing Guidelines. This legislation, which is
commonly known as the Feeney Amendment and was part of a larger enactment
known as the PROTECT Act, imposed a series of sentencing "reforms" intended
to make it more difficult for federal district judges to grant downward departures
from the Guidelines and for such departures to be upheld on appeal.
Vinegrad, supra note 10, at 98. In his article, Vinegrad outlined the six separate grounds for departure
the Sentencing Commission eliminated in compliance with the PROTECT Act's directives. See id.
214. Id. at 98. One of the most striking acts of protest was the resignation of the Honorable John
Martin, a well-regarded district court judge in New York who had served as the United States Attorney
in the Southern District of New York. See id.; see also Weintraub & Kuehne, supra note 8, at IS
("The Feeney Amendment has in effect jolted the entire federal judiciary with a lightening [sic] rod to
reform sentencing reform.").
215. See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 771 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
216. See STITH & CABRANEs, supra note 17, at xi (recognizing structural and other constraints
in the context of proposing reforms to the Guidelines).
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opinions. The second is that they do not attempt to address the important,
overarching questions about the appropriate goals of sentencing and whether the
Guidelines system best meets those goals. In other words, these proposals may not
result in the best possible sentencing scheme. Rather, I make a more modest claim.
I begin from the premise that the goals of the Guidelines were salutary 17 and from
the related premise that the Guidelines are now too deeply entrenched in our
criminal justice system to eliminated easily. However, the Guidelines do need
modification. I also start from the view that the majorities in Apprendi, Blakely,
and Booker A were correct in holding that the Sixth Amendment forbids judicial
fact-finding that increases a defendant's maximum sentence.218
The Guidelines currently direct sentencing judges to calculate sentences by
applying provisions from several different chapters of the Guidelines Manual. In
summary form, judges first determine the applicable Guidelines section from
chapter two, then apply the "relevant conduct" provision in chapter one to
determine the "base offense level." Next, courts make specific adjustments
pursuant to the chapter two provisions, and then make further adjustments
according to the chapter three provisions that apply to all offenses. After
determining the defendant's criminal history category from chapter four, judges
then refer to the sentencing table in chapter five to determine the sentence.219 As
a preliminary step toward making mandatory Guidelines compliant with Blakely,
I propose changes to particular provisions of chapters one, two, three and five.
1. Chapter One: Amending the "Relevant Conduct" Provision
The Guidelines instruct judges first to "[d]etermine the offense guideline
section ... applicable to the offense of conviction .... ",22o For example, the
applicable Guidelines section for a drug trafficking offense is § 2D 1.1. That section
alone constitutes twenty-seven pages, multiple sub-sections, and extensive
commentary, and includes a drug quantity table that provides for base offense levels
ranging from six to thirty-eight. These base offense levels correspond to sentencing
ranges for first-time offenders, before adjustments, that vary from 0-6 months
(Level 6) to 235-292 months (Level 38)."' To determine the applicable guideline
range within the section, the judge must refer to the relevant conduct provision.
222
The relevant conduct provision, which commentators have called "the
'cornerstone' of the guideline system, ' 223 is also one of the most maligned 224 and
217. I recognize that there is substantial evidence that sentencing disparities "have continued to
plague the system" even after the Guidelines. Osler, supra note 53, at 683. However, I believe that
unwarranted disparities would become even more acute under an advisory Guidelines system.
218. I recognize compelling contrary arguments. See supra note 72.
219. See U.S.S.G. §§ 1B1.1-2 (Nov. 2004).
220. Id. § 1B1.2(a) (Nov. 2004); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2000) (providing that the court
shall impose a sentence within guideline range, except under narrow circumstances).
221. See id. § 2D1.1 (Nov. 2004) and Sentencing Table, Exhibit A, supra note 45.
222. See id. § 1B1.2(b) (Nov. 2004) (citing § 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct)).
223. Pamela B. Lawrence & Paul J. Hofer, An Empirical Study of the Application of the Relevant
Conduct Guideline §IB.3, 10 FED. SENT. REP. 16, 16 (1997) (citing William W. Wilkins, Jr. & John
R. Steer, Relevant Conduct: The Cornerstone of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 41 S.C. L. REV.
495 (1990)).
224. See, e.g., David Yellen, Illusion, Illogic, and Injustice: Real-Offense Sentencing and the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 78 MINN. L. REV. 403, 403 (1993). Yellen explained:
One of the most remarkable and controversial aspects of the Federal Sentencing
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problematic. By its terms, the "relevant conduct" provision provides that the base
offense level
shall be determined on the basis of....
all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled,
commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the
defendant...
that occurred during the commission of the offense of
conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course of
attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for thatoffense[.] 2"
The wording of this provision is broad, and, under pre-Blakely practice, required
the judge to consider not just the crimes for which the Government formally
charged and convicted the defendant, but also uncharged crimes and even acquitted
conduct.226
A scheme contemplating that judges will sentence defendants based upon facts
beyond those underlying the offense of conviction goes to the heart of Blakely's
concern. Thus, Congress must modify the relevant conduct provision in order to
return to a system of mandatory Guidelines.227 Although perhaps facially valid as
a theoretical matter,22 one would be hard-pressed to imagine the invocation or
application of this provision in a manner consistent with Blakely and Booker A.
Indeed, the sentencing judge's application of this provision in Booker-fiding that
the defendant had quantities of crack over and above the quantities the jury
found-was the primary reason that the court of appeals invalidated Booker's
sentence after Blakely.
A simple amendment to the relevant conduct provision could provide for the
determination of the base offense level based upon "the defendant's admissions or
the jury's findings regarding all acts and omissions caused by the defendant that
occurred during the commission of the offense." This amendment retains the "real
offense" goal of the Guidelines in directing the judge to take into account all of the
jury's factual findings in imposing a sentence.22 For example, if the jury found that
Guidelines... is that the length of a defendant's sentence may be based, not only
upon the crimes for which the defendant has been convicted, but also upon
" alleged crimes related to the offense of conviction, for which the defendant was
not convicted.
Id. at 403.
225. U.S.S.G. § IB1.3(a) (Nov. 2004).
226. David N. Yellen, Is "Relevant Conduct" Relevant? Reconsidering the Guidelines'
Approach to Real Offense Sentencing, 44 ST. Louis U. L.J. 409, 410 (2000); Johnson, supra note 56,
at 160 (noting that relevant conduct "includes a vast array of activity related to the offense of conviction
and deemed pertinent to the offender's culpability").
227. Cf. Russell, supra note 58.
228. One could interpret the provision, after Booker A, as requiring that a jury find relevant
conduct. Cf. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 779 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("As a textual
matter, the word 'court' [in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)] can certainly be read to include a judge's selection of
a sentence as supported by a jury verdict ...."). Although reading the word in that way to avoid a
constitutional infirmity is possible, Congress did not have jury fact-finding in mind.
229. Of course, guilty pleas resolve the vast majority of cases. See Bibas, supra note 58, at 1100.
In a plea situation, the sentencing judge would have to account for all of the facts the defendant
admitted during the course of the plea or to which the defendant stipulated as part of a plea agreement.
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a defendant distributed 100 grams of cocaine, and then made a further finding that
the defendant also distributed one kilogram of cocaine, the amended relevant
conduct provision would make plain that the judge must sentence based upon the
total quantity of narcotics found, rather than based only upon the 100 gram
quantity. The key is that the findings are the jur's 23° and that all such relevant
factual findings are accounted for in sentencing.
Regardless of the merits of "real-offense" sentencing,232 where judges are the
finders of "real facts," Blakely bars this aspect of the Guidelines. In addition, tying
the relevant conduct provision to trial findings or the defendant's admissions would
have the salutary effect of immediately making sentencings less cumbersome, more
straightforward, and fairer to defendants for the reasons Professor David Yellen and
others have long articulated."3 As Yellen has argued, many current aspects of real-
offense sentencing-with sentences radically divorced from jury findings-simply
do not comport with our intuitive sense of what is right and just.234
Justice Breyer and others would argue, of course, that altering the "relevant
conduct" provision in this way allows prosecutors to determine the sentence based
upon the charge alone. As Justice Breyer said in Booker, in examining the facts of
that case, a system that forces a jury rather than the judge to find facts about
quantity, "is a system in which the prosecutor, not the judge, would control the
sentence. That is because it is the prosecutor who would have to decide what drug
amount to charge."" The notion that Booker B resolves this problem is misguided.
One of the most persistent defenses of the relevant conduct provision, and
"real-offense" sentencing generally, is that the mechanism controls prosecutorial
discretion by limiting undue prosecutorial leniency. To the extent that the purpose
of the relevant conduct provision was to prevent prosecutors from making an "end
run" around the intended severity of the Guidelines, the provision is toothless in the
230. In the event of a plea, the sentencing would be based upon the defendant's admissions.
231. This proposal minimizes the problem of treating very different defendants uniformly. See
supra notel 19.
232. See generally O'Sullivan, supra note 51 (describing real-offense aspects of the Guidelines).
233. See, e.g., Yellen, supra note 51, at 1436-38 (criticizing real-offense sentencing); Yellen,
supra note 226, at 454-59 (criticizing mandatory related-offense sentencing); Yellen, supra note 226,
at 409-11 (discussing the impact and power of relevant conduct principle); cf Osler, supra note 53, at
652, 669-70.
234. See Yellen, supra note 51, at 1437:
[I]t has been my experience that almost every lay person, regardless of political
inclination, is shocked to learn that a federal judge must increase a sentence based
on conduct for which the defendant has been acquitted. I believe the reason for
this shock is the intuitive judgment that society's right to punish an individual
flows directly from, and is limited by, the conduct for which that individual has
been convicted. In Professor O'Sullivan's world [see supra note 51] (and the
Sentencing Commission's), just deserts becomes a free floating rationale not
anchored to the legal process of conviction.
See also Johnson, supra note 56, at 154 ("That an offender's sentence may be enhanced, sometimes
dramatically, on the basis of conduct for which he was acquitted strikes many as counterintuitive and
inappropriate.").
235. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 763 (2005).
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overall scheme of the Guidelines.236 In reality, this provision only has teeth when
prosecutors use it as a weapon.
A number of reasons explain this proposition. Prosecutors can choose to
charge crimes that have statutory maximum sentences that serve to defeat the
relevant conduct provision.237 As discussed above, the maximum sentence for a
defendant charged with narcotics distribution under § 841 (b)(1)(C) of Title 21 can
be no longer than the statutory maximum boundary of twenty years, even if the
Guidelines would otherwise require a longer sentence. 23' More dramatically, a
prosecutor can drop more serious charges and pursue simply a "telephone count,"
which provides a statutory maximum sentence of four years for using a telephone
to facilitate a drug transaction.239 In addition, prosecutors can simply opt not to
pursue factual information that would cause the relevant conduct provision to
increase the defendant's sentence.2 4" In our adversarial system, a "real-offense"
sentencing scheme works only as intended if prosecutors are motivated to oversee
wide-ranging investigations into the full scale of a convicted defendant's criminal
activity. Because "real-offense" sentencing depends so heavily upon prosecutors,
different prosecutorial practices (which are the inevitable consequence of separate
and, in large part, independent United States Attorney's offices in each federal
district) can subvert the goal of reduced disparity in sentencing that was a primary
motivation behind the Guidelines.
The notion that the current Guidelines achieve uniformity by getting to the
"real facts" through judicial fact-finding and probation officer investigations is
naive. Only in a rare case would the discovery of "real facts" without the
cooperation of the prosecutor be possible; in the vast majority of cases, the
uncovering or disclosure of facts occurs at the prosecutor's instigation. The real
question is who should decide the "real facts." Blakely clearly contemplated that
juries, rather than judges, should make such decisions. Regardless of who the
decision-maker is, whether judge or jury, the system does not ascertain "real facts"
in situations where prosecutors choose not to investigate or present all the facts.
My proposed amendment will not necessarily do a better job of forcing
prosecutors to consistently develop the "real facts" than does the current system
that contemplates judicial fact-finding. Rather, my position is that the fact-finder's
236. Cf. Yellen, supra note 51, at 1438 (noting that "alleged-related offense sentencing neither
ends prosecutorial leniency, nor eliminates unwarranted disparity"); see also Wiliam J. Stuntz, Plea
Bargaining and Criminal Law's Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REv. 2548,2549 (2004) (noting
that "criminal law and the law of sentencing define prosecutors' options, not litigation outcomes.").
237. See Yellen, supra note 51, at 1438-39 ("Prosecutors have a variety of ways to reward
favored defendants. These include charging offenses with low statutory maximums ...."); Standen,
supra note 8, at 789 (observing that "the plasticity of criminal statutes, particularly in a federal system
lacking a coherent criminal code, invites prosecutorial manipulation of sentences by selective charging
and plea decisions") (footnotes omitted).
238. See supra Part Ill.B.
239. 21 U.S.C. § 843(b), (c).
240. When I practiced in the Southern District of New York, probation officers routinely relied
on prosecutors to provide the charging instruments and other materials that would form the bases for
making the proposed sentencing calculations for the court to apply under the Guidelines. If a trial has
occurred, that information can be quite extensive; if a guilty plea resolved the case, the information may
consist of little more than the charging instrument and plea agreement.
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findings are almost always necessarily limited by the prosecutor's choices.24'
Given the structure of the Department of Justice, the Guidelines simply cannot
resolve problems with disparities in prosecutorial practices. However, my proposed
amendment does have the salutary effect of recognizing that juries, rather than
judges, should find the facts.
Furthermore, by amending rather than eliminating the relevant conduct
provision, the Guidelines retain the requirement that a defendant's sentence should
be based upon the totality of his actual conduct-at least insofar as the Government
has proved it beyond a reasonable doubt under the ordinary rules of evidence. As
Justice Scalia derisively noted, the current system allows judges to find "'real
conduct"' based upon "bureaucratically prepared, hearsay-riddled presentence
reports . . 242
Under my proposal, prosecutors will likely charge whatever facts they think
they can prove and take their chances with a jury; at best, they will prove the entire
case, and, at worst, they will likely prove some of it. Under the current Guidelines
regime, prosecutors have a perverse incentive to try only narrow, readily proven
facts to a jury, knowing that they will have the benefit later of proving "shakier"
facts to a judge based upon a mere preponderance standard.243
2. Chapter Two: An Increased Role for Juries and a Call for
Simplification
Transferring more factual determinations to jurors after Blakely and Booker
broadly vindicates the Sixth Amendment values that were at the heart of Blakely
and Booker A. Some facts are more conducive to jury fact-finding than others:
those related to drug quantity, for example, seem particularly suitable to jury
determination. After Apprendi, "drug quantity is an element of [21 U.S.C.] § 841
that must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt," 2" at least insofar as the
government seeks to sentence a defendant beyond the lowest-level statutory penalty
provisions in the narcotics laws.
2 41
Other factual determinations under the Guidelines that are particularly
amenable to jury fact-finding include the question of whether the defendant carried
a firearm and questions related to monetary losses in fraud cases. While a section-
by-section analysis of all of the offense conduct provisions of chapter two is beyond
the scope of this Article, many of the provisions of that chapter survive Blakely, and
241. Cf. James B. Jacobs, Sentencing by Prison Personnel: Good Time, 30 UCLA L. REv. 217,
218-19 (1982) (noting "invisible" sentencing discretion that various actors exercised in the criminal
justice system during the pre-Guidelines regime).
242. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 791 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting in part); see also
Osler, supra note 53, at 669 (noting that a defendant's sentence can be greatly increased "based on
nothing more than unsubstantial hearsay contained in the presentence report presented to the judge.").
243. See Osler, supra note 53, at 670 ("the relevant conduct provision furthers the corrosive effect
of promoting fact-gathering as a function of sentencing rather than trial. As [Professor Daniel] Freed
notes, the current relevant conduct rule has created strong incentives for the prosecutor to dodge trial
and instead bring facts at sentencing") (citing Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of the
Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentences, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1714 (1992)).
244. United States v. Moreno, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17947, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2000)
(collecting cases).
245. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) (2000) (providing for maximum sentence of twenty years) and
discussion supra Part III.
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other provisions are susceptible to reformulation so that juries make the called-for
factual determinations.
For example, in the aggravated assault provisions, the base offense level is
fourteen, in addition to which the Guidelines contemplate a number of potential
upward adjustments.2" If the assault involved "more than minimal planning," the
judge is to increase the offense by two levels;247 if the defendant used a firearm, the
judge is to add from three to five levels.2" If the victim sustained injuries, the
judge is to increase the defendant's sentence by from three to seven levels,
depending upon the scope of the injuries.249 If pecuniary gain motivated the assault,
the judge adjusts upward by two levels;2"' if the defendant violated a court order,
the increase is two levels.2 ' If the defendant's crime of conviction was under 18
U.S.C. § 11 (b) or § 115, the court is directed to add two more levels.2"2 Thus, the
judge can increase the base offense level by a total of eighteen levels during the
adjustment stage, resulting in an offense level of thirty-two which, for a first-time
offender, results in a Guidelines range of 121-151 months, versus an 18-24 month
sentencing range for a base offense level of fifteen.2"3
Scrutinizing this Guidelines provision suggests ways to streamline and simplify
the Guidelines with the goal of making them more "juror-friendly." Distinguishing
between discharging, "otherwise us[ing]," and brandishing or threatening to use a
firearm or dangerous weapon seems unnecessary. Distinguishing between firing
and merely carrying a gun makes sense, but to parse further the possible ways a
defendant can use weapon seems overly technical and bureaucratic, and not easily
susceptible to jury determination. The provision's current division of types of
injury to a victim into five discrete levels suffers from the same problem.2
Deciding whether an assault crime was "motivated by a payment or offer of
money or other thing of value ' 255 is not very different from the kind of
determination jurors already have to make in cases involving murder-for-hire under
the racketeering laws.256 Determining whether the offense "involved the violation
of a court protection order,"257 however, involves questions of legal interpretation
and should perhaps be stricken from the Guidelines provision rather than being
turned over to a jury. Eliminating this provision would have the net effect of
246. U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2 (Nov. 2004).
247. Id. § 2A2.2(b)(1).
248. Id. § 2A2.2(b)(2).
249. Id. §§ 2A2.2(b)(3)(A)-(E). The cumulative effect of the weapons and injury adjustments,
however, cannot exceed ten levels. See id.
250. Id. § 2A2.2(b)(4).
251. U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2(b)(5) (Nov. 2004).
252. Id. § 2A2.2(b)(6).
253. See id.
254. See id. §§ 2A2.2(b)(3)(A)-(E) (Nov. 2004).
255. Id. § 2A2.2(b)(4).
256. See 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a) (2000) ("Whoever, as consideration for the receipt of, or as
consideration for a promise or agreement to pay, anything of pecuniary value from an enterprise
engaged in racketeering activity .... murders... or threatens to commit a crime of violence against any
individual.., shall be punished .... ).
257. U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2(b)(5) (Nov. 2004).
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reducing the maximum offense level under this Guideline from thirty-two to
thirty.
2 5
Having jurors decide the key facts that affect the defendant's sentence
vindicates a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights,2"9 but not everyone would agree
that this approach is advisable. As Justice (then Judge) Breyer argued in his early
article about the Guidelines,
[a] drug crime defendant ... cannot be expected to argue at trial to the jury
that, even though he never possessed any drugs, if he did so, he possessed
only one hundred grams and not five hundred, as the government claimed.
There must be a post-trial procedure for determining such facts.26°
Justice Breyer expressed similar reservations in his recent Blakely dissent."6 The
obvious concern is that requiring a defendant to argue quantity before a jury will
prejudice the defendant as his focus on the quantity undermines his claim of
innocence on the underlying charge.
This concern is probably overstated. Defendants are frequently in the position
of having to make arguments in the alternative at trial. For example, a defendant
charged with both drug distribution and the use of a firearm in a drug trafficking
offense may necessarily have to argue that he did not deal drugs, but even if he did,
he did not carry a gun. The reality of drug trials is that facts about quantity and any
use of weapons are often inextricably intertwined with facts about the underlying
offense.262 Details about the offense that ultimately affect the sentence are likewise
relevant in many other types of criminal trials. In the above example of the
Guidelines provisions related to aggravated assault, the prosecutor would almost
certainly-seek to introduce, at the underlying trial, evidence of any use of a weapon
or injuries the victim sustained. Facts that are relevant to sentencing often are
bound up in the core crime. To the extent certain cases involve particular facts that
are unusually prejudicial, courts can consider appropriate stipulations,263 or
defendants can waive their right to jury determinations of such facts.2
To the extent pre-Blakely practice allowed prosecutors to opt not to present all
aggravating facts to a jury, but instead to prove only the basics of the crime to a
jury and then seek an enhancement later from the judge based upon the
258. Because an effort to simplify and streamline the Guidelines will have this effect, I propose
expanding the maximum possible sentence at each Guideline level to counterbalance this downward
force on sentences. See infra Part V.C.
259. See Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2543 (2004) ("Our Constitution and the
common-law traditions it entrenches ... do not admit the contention that facts are better discovered by
judicial inquisition than by adversarial testing before a jury.") (citation omitted).
260. Breyer, supra note 17, at 10.
261. See Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2556-57 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
262. I can think of no instance as a federal prosecutor where I would have deferred until sentencing
any presentation of evidence about drug quantities or the use of firearms in a drug trial. Such information
is often part of the "narrative force" of the Government's presentation at trial. See Old Chief v. United
States, 519 U.S. 172, 186-89 (1997) (noting that the Government generally may prove its case as it sees
fit).
263. See Old Chief, 519 U.S. 172, 175-178 (discussing defendant's offer to stipulate to prior
conviction in felony possession case).
264. See Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2541 ("Even a defendant who stands trial may consent to judicial
factfimding as to sentence enhancements, which may well be in his interest if relevant evidence would
prejudice him at trial.").
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preponderance standard, this practice goes to the core of the Sixth Amendment
violation Blakely identified. Forcing prosecutors to put more facts before juries
vindicates the constitutional interests at the heart of that decision. As Professor
Barry L. Johnson has powerfully argued, "Jury participation in the criminal justice
system serves several important values. One such value is to ensure the
'substantive criminal law's objective of onlypunishing those defendants who are
morally culpable in the community's eyes."' 2
Professor Erik Lillquist, however, recently highlighted a troubling concern with
an increased role for juries in sentencing. He points out that, when juries have more
options from which to choose, more juries will opt to convict, and the number of
acquittals will decrease.2" In other words, ifjurors only have the option of "guilty"
or "not guilty" on a simple count, they are more likely to acquit outright than if they
have a menu of different conviction choices.267 While bifurcating jury trials into
guilt and penalty phases is a possible solution, most people view bifurcation as
expensive and time-consuming. 68
However, a less costly and less time-consuming alternative to bifurcation is
available. To the extent that much of the sentencing evidence is, in fact, relevant
at the underlying trial, jurors could receive serial verdict forms. Juries could
initially decide the guilt or innocence of the defendant on the core underlying
statute, and upon a finding of guilt, then make the factual determinations specific
to the sentence.
Another problem with increased jury involvement at sentencing is the problem
of the "ignorant decision-maker." Whereas judges under the current Guidelines
fully understand the implications of their factual findings, juries would not.
Traditionally, juries have been kept ignorant of the sentencing implications of their
decisions.269 At first blush, leaving more sentencing decisions to jurors might
appear to exacerbate this problem.
265. Johnson, supra note 56, at 183-84 (quoting Peter Aranella, Rethinking the Functions of
Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Burger Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185, 216
(1983)).
266. See Erik Liliquist, The Puzzling Return of Jury Sentencing: Misgivings About Apprendi, 82
N.C. L. REv. 621 (2004). As Lillquist explains:
Ironically, Apprendi may cause more harms to defendants than benefits.
Apprendi, in short, should result in more convictions. This is because Apprendi,
at least as it has been implemented in many courts, has the effect of increasing the
number of options placed before the jury. Where once the jury had a decision
between not guilty or guilty, now the jury must decide among not guilty, guilty
of a lesser offense, or guilty of a greater offense.
Id. at 623. Of course, Blakely only magnifies this effect. Whereas the prevailing view post-Apprendi
and pre-Blakely was that judges still made the factual determinations that increased sentences within
the Guidelines-as opposed to factual determinations that increased maximum statutory
sentences-after Blakely, juries may be called upon to make many more factual determinations,
effectively expanding their menu of conviction options even further. Cf. Blakely v. Washington, 124
S. Ct. 2531, 2543 (2004) (noting "modest inconvenience to the State of submitting its accusation" to
a jury).
267. See Lillquist, supra note 266, at 623.
268. See Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2556 (Breyer, I., dissenting); Standen, supra note 8, at 794.
269. See Bibas, supra note 58, at 1134 n.249 ("Juries are not told about penalties and indeed are
forbidden to consider them."). I will leave for another day questions about the wisdom of keeping full
information from jurors, a practice that also permeates the Federal Rules of Evidence and other aspects
of criminal trials.
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Upon further reflection, the problem of the ignorant decision-maker is more
acute under the current Guidelines regime than under a proposed system in which
jurors complete serial verdict forms. Under the current system, jurors have no way
of knowing that a verdict of "guilty" may set in motion an extended sentencing
hearing at which the court may, for example, make sentencing determinations based
upon conduct for which the jury has acquitted the defendant.27 By finding a
defendant guilty, under the current Guidelines, jurors unwittingly trigger far longer
sentences than they realize. Yet, if courts specifically askedjurors to make findings
as to quantity, use of a firearm, and other specific characteristics of the offense, the
jurors would likely contemplate that those judgments would be relevant to the
ultimate sentence.27'
3. Chapter Three Role Adjustments and the Sentencing Table
The Guidelines chapter three adjustments related to victims, role in the offense,
and obstruction ofjustice require consideration after Blakely and Booker.272 Some
adjustments will be more readily determinable byjuries than others. The source of
an adjustment for obstruction of justice, for example, could come from additional
jury factual findings after the decision on the underlying crime or, if that solution
is not practical273 and the Government does not wish to charge obstruction as a
separate crime, a higher sentence within the Guidelines range. Determining
whether a defendant had an "aggravating role" in an offense,274 however, may not
be as susceptible to jury determination.
A defendant's "role in the offense," whether mitigating or aggravating, is a
classic sentencing factor. To the extent that a judge makes a mitigating role
determination, the judge decreases the defendant's sentence. This practice does not
run afoul of Blakely. However, because the current Guidelines contemplate
aggravating role adjustments based upon factual determinations such as the number
of people supervised, such enhancements conflict with Blakely, even though a
decision about a defendant's role in the offense is the kind of factor a judge might
traditionally have considered in pronouncing the sentence under a discretionary
scheme.
270. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
271. But see King & Klein, supra note 40, at 319 ("Blakely does not mandate jury sentencing,
only jury fact-finding for facts triggering sentences beyond those authorized by the conviction alone;
the jury will still not know the punishment consequences of its findings.").
272. Some such changes suggest themselves. For example, with regard to the Guidelines section
on hate crimes, which contemplates that the "finder of fact at trial" should make any findings such as
racial animus "beyond a reasonable doubt," a simple modification to the subsection could eliminate that
portion that also provides that the sentencing judge can make such findings after a plea (unless the
defendant admits them). See U.S.S.G. § 3A 1.1 (Nov. 2004). Such judicial findings are precisely what
Apprendi and Blakely deconstitutionalized.
273. If trial perjury were the basis of the "obstruction ofjustice," the court could presumably ask
the jury to make a factual determination on that point if it rendered a guilty verdict on the underlying
crime at trial. If obstruction ofjustice occurred after trial but before sentencing, the Government would
have the option of bringing a new charge or seeking a higher sentence within the Guidelines range. See
United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 772 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Because the Guidelines
as written possess the virtue of combining a mandatory determination of sentencing ranges and
discretionary decisions -within those ranges, they allow ample latitude for judicial factfinding that does
not even arguably raise any Sixth Amendment issue.").
274. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 (Nov. 2004).
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My proposed amendment to this section of the Guidelines is to eliminate
aggravating role adjustments in favor of expanded Guidelines ranges at each level.
This change would enable judges to exercise expanded discretion in assessing a
defendant's role, but prevent judges from giving sentences that Congress would
likely consider too lenient. Specifically, I propose that, at each level of the new
Sentencing Table, the maximum sentence shall be the maximum sentence that
currently corresponds to the offense level that is three levels higher (L + 3).275 For
example, whereas the current sentencing table provides for a range of zero to six
months at offense level seven, six to twelve months at offense level ten, and twelve
to eighteen months for offense level thirteen, the new ranges would provide zero
to twelve months at offense level seven, six to eighteen months at offense level ten,
and so on.276
With an expanded sentencing range available at each level, judges can take the
defendant's "role in the offense" into account by sentencing organizers and leaders
at the higher end of the Guidelines range. Expanded ranges will also help offset
any other downward force in sentencing Blakely and Booker exerted.
Finally, I propose the simplification and regularization of the entire Sentencing
Table, such that all sentences are multiples of six, corresponding to half-year
increments. This change makes sentencing options more transparent. Thus, in
creating my Proposed New Sentencing Table reproduced below, I first regularized
all sentences so that they are easily divisible into half-year periods. In Category II,
for example, the sentencing range at offense level seven of two to eight months
under the current Sentencing Table277 became zero to six months; the current
sentencing range at offense level eight of four to ten months,27 became six to
twelve. All numbers were rounded to the nearest multiple of six. Once the table
was "regularized," I made the upward adjustments at each level as described above
(L + 3). Thus, the maximum sentence that previously corresponded to level forty-
three would now correspond to level forty, the maximum sentence that previously
corresponded to level forty-two would now correspond to level thirty-nine, and so
on. Other than "regularizing" each number to make it divisible by six, as described
above, I made no changes to the minimum sentences in the sentence ranges.
275. Cf. Memorandum from Frank Bowman to the United States Sentencing Commission (June
27, 2004), available at 16 FED. SENT. REP. 364 (2004) (proposing what has become known as the
"Bowman Fix," which would simply raise the top of each Guideline level to the statutory maximum);
Mark Osler, The Blakely Problem and the 3x Solution, 16 FED. SENT. REP. 344, 344-45 (2004) (calling
for ranges that would be "either 18 months or 75% of the bottom of the bottom of the range, whichever
is higher"). The "Bowman Fix," while likely very appealing to a Congress most concerned about undue
judicial leniency, would provide such large ranges that unwarranted disparities in sentences would
inevitably recur. In addition, his system would make plea negotiations more difficult, because
defendants would have no reasonable assurances about the outer bounds of their sentences. Cf Jacobs,
supra note 241, at 240 ("Determinate sentencing promises to relieve prisoners' uncertainty by providing
a certain release date[.J"); Jeffrey R. Stem, Note, Preemption Doctrine and the Failure of Textualism
in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 80 VA. L. REV. 979, 992 (1985) ("As outcomes become more certain,
litigators settle claims or otherwise avoid litigation.").
Osler's proposal is intriguing, but provides ranges that are too great at the lower levels. Starting
at Level 35, L+3 begins to result in ranges that are even greater than those Oster proposes.
276. See Proposed New Sentencing Table, Exhibit B, infra. In the example, the given range is
for a person in Criminal History Category 1. See Sentencing Table, Exhibit A, supra note 45, and
Proposed New Sentencing Table, Exhibit B, infra.
277. See Sentencing Table, Exhibit A, supra note 45.
278. See id.
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One advantage of the Guidelines is that they are a work in progress, susceptible
to modification. To the extent thatjudges complain that the current Guidelines give
them too little discretion, but Congress distrusts judges it perceives to be lenient,
this proposed change in the sentencing table allows Congress to monitor the success
of expanded discretion.279 Would judges, for example, start sentencing leaders of
criminal organizations toward the top end of the new ranges? If not, then a
reassessment of the Guidelines would be in order.
279. As Booker B made clear, "[Tlhe Sentencing Commission remains in place, writing
Guidelines, collecting information about actual district court sentencing decisions, undertaking research,
and revising the Guidelines accordingly." United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 767 (2005). Indeed,
the Commission just sent out a missive to all judges making clear that, post-Booker, its collection of
statistical information is more important than ever.
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EXHIBIT B
PROPOSED NEW SENTENCING TABLE
(IN MONTHS OF IMPRISONMENT)
CRIMINAL HISTORY CATEGORY (CRIMINAL HISTORY POINTS)
Offenses I 11 111 IV V VI
Level (0 or 1) (2 or 3) (4,5,6) (7,8,9) (10,11,12) (13 or more)
1 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-12 0-12
2 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-12 0-12 0-18
3 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-12 0-12 6-18
4 0-6 0-6 0-12 0-12 6-18 6-24
5 0-6 0-12 0-12 6-18 12-18 12-24
6 0-12 0-12 0-12 6-18 12-24 12-30
7 0-12 0-12 6-18 6-24 12-30 18-30
8 0-12 6-18 6-18 12-24 18-30 18-36
9 6-18 6-18 6-24 12-30 18-36 24-36
10 6-18 6-24 12-24 18-30 24-36 24-42
11 6-24 12-24 12-30 18-36 24-42 30-48
12 12-24 12-30 18-30 24-36 30-48 30-54
13 12-30 18-30 18-36 24-42 30-54 36-60
14 18-30 18-36 24-40 30-48 36-60 36-66
15 18-36 24-40 24-48 30-54 36-66 42-72
16 24-40 24-48 30-54 36-60 42-72 48-78
17 24-48 30-54 30-54 36-66 48-78 54-90
18 30-54 30-54 36-60 42-72 54-90 60-96
19 30-54 36-60 36-66 48-78 60-96 66-108
20 36-60 36-66 42-72 54-90 66-108 72-120
21 36-66 42-72 48-78 60-96 72-120 78-126
22 42-72 48-78 54-90 66-108 78-126 84-138
23 48-78 54-90 60-96 72-120 84-138 90-150
24 54-90 60-96 66-108 78-126 90-150 102-162
25 60-96 66-108 72-120 84-138 102-162 108-174
26 66-108 72-120 78-138 90-150 108-174 120-186
27 72-120 78-138 90-150 102-162 120-186 132-210
28 78-138 90-150 96-168 108-174 132-210 138-234
29 90-150 96-168 108-186 120-186 138-234 150-264
30 96-168 108-186 120-210 138-234 150-264 168-294
31 108-186 120-210 138-234 150-264 168-294 186-330
32 120-210 138-234 150-264 168-294 186-330 210-366
33 138-234 150-264 168-294 186-330 210-366 234-406
34 150-264 168-294 186-330 210-366 234-406 264-life
35 168-294 186-330 210-366 234-406 264-life 294-life
36 188-330 210-366 234-406 264-life 294-life 324-life
37 210-366 234-406 264-life 294-life 324-life 360-life
38 234-406 264-life 292-life 324-life 360-life 360-life
39 264-1ife 292-life 324-life 360-life 360-life 360-life
40 292-life 324-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life
41 324-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life
42 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life
43 Life Life Life Life Life Life
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V. CONCLUSION
These changes are merely a start in what will be a long and laborious process
ofreassessing the Guidelines after Blakely and Booker. Simplifying the Guidelines
is a salutary goal in itself. To comply with the Sixth Amendment without
jettisoning mandatory Guidelines requires a greater role for juries at sentencing,
making Guidelines simplification not just desirable, but essential. The Guidelines
are certainly imperfect, but I agree with those-including the Blakely dissenters
who comprised the Booker B majority-who argue that the goals of sentencing
reform were worthy ones. Unfortunately, Booker B's fix eviscerates the most
important feature of the Guidelines while failing to address the Sixth Amendment,
due process, and fairness concerns implicit in a system that depends heavily upon
judicial fact-finding based on a mere preponderance standard. The relative
harshness of the current Guidelines regime is arguably more justifiable if
defendants receive sentencing enhancements only on the basis of facts juries find
beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Guidelines have always been a "work in progress," and Blakely and
Booker present an opportunity to fix some of their most problematic features. It
would be unfortunate if Congress were to respond to Booker by simply enacting
harsh mandatory minimum sentences for most federal crimes. Salvaging the
Guidelines is possible, but will have to occur in the current political climate in
which Congress is manifestly mistrustful of the scope of sentencing discretion that
Booker B contemplated. Giving more authority to jurors protects the rights of
criminal defendants and avoids the problems that plagued the pre-Guidelines era.
In addition, giving judges limited additional discretion to impose higher sentences
within revised sentencing ranges may be one way to satisfy both Congress and
judges alike.
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